Afghanistan: the path to victory

Joint Force Quarterly, July, 2009 by Joseph J. Collins

When the Taliban ruled, it conducted numerous crimes against humanity for which there has never been an accounting. In addition to the extreme repression of its citizenry--no kites, no music, no female education, executions at soccer matches, etc.--thousands of non-Pashtun Afghans were killed for sport by the Taliban. Anyone wanting to reconcile with the Taliban will also have to figure out how to deal with the guys who have been planting [improvised explosive devices], kidnapping civilians ... destroying reconstruction projects in the countryside ... burning girls' schools, and cutting off the heads of non-combatants.... While [President] Karzai may see some of the Taliban as wayward brothers, his non-Pashtun allies do not. (5)

There are no viable alternatives to a full-bodied counterinsurgency and state-building approach in Afghanistan. There is no substitute for defeating the Taliban as a military threat and subsequently preparing the Afghan state to deal independently with its own security and economic problems. To take a halfway measure or to quit now on the Afghans would ultimately invite the re-Talibanization of Afghanistan and the reestablishment of the al Qaeda sanctuary. As warm a base area for terrorism as Pakistan has become, it does not compare in any dimension to the freedom and facilities present in pre-9/11 Afghanistan. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates reminded us: "To fail--or to be seen to fail--in either Iraq or Afghanistan would be a disastrous blow to U.S. credibility, both among friends and allies, and among potential adversaries." (6) While the concept of victory in irregular wars is often ambiguous and unsatisfying, General Douglas MacArthur's statement is valid in this case. In Afghanistan, "there is no substitute for victory."

What Went Wrong?

To find the path to victory, one must first review how this "good war" went bad. Since 2004, the Taliban has clearly done more to regain its lost status than the coalition has done to advance its objectives. Among the key strengths possessed by the Taliban are a few thousand dedicated cadres, excellent funding from the drug trade and Persian Gulf charities, and the luxury of an unimpeded sanctuary in a neighboring country. Hampering the combat endeavor are the half-hearted efforts of most North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations and the complex decision mechanisms associated with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

NATO, meant to be a solution, has become a big part of the security problem. The standing of the Alliance in Afghanistan could not be lower. Ponderous, flat-footed, and rank-heavy, the NATO command has been a grave disappointment, with even our smallest Allies taking their daily cues (and numerous caveats) from their capitals. Although NATO voluntarily took over the nationwide military mission in 2006, most of the continental powers--Germany, Italy, and Spain, for example--have refused to engage in combat under any circumstances. Our Allies--except the British, Canadians, Dutch, and a few others--have been a total disappointment. They not only fight ineffectively, but also their risk aversion has caused them on occasion to impede the operational effectiveness of other police and military forces. (7) They are also not carrying their share of the development assistance burden. To say the least, Afghan officials are very disappointed with European military and financial support.