Afghanistan: the path to victory

Joint Force Quarterly, July, 2009 by Joseph J. Collins

All efforts in Afghanistan must be mirrored in our policy toward Pakistan. Islamabad, too, needs aid. At the same time, Pakistan must end its links to the Taliban and begin to combat the Afghan Taliban resident on its soil, as it has begun to fight the Pakistani Taliban that threatens its emerging democracy. Pakistan's leaders should help us fight "our" Taliban, and we should help them fight theirs.

Since much of Pakistan's attitude toward Afghanistan reflects its threat perceptions concerning India, it is incumbent on the United States to work to lower Indo-Pakistani tensions. Confidence can be built through discussions, and through both sides showing more transparency vis-a-vis their policies in and toward Afghanistan. Ironically, India does not want to engage in such talks. In a similar vein, a strategic dialogue with Iran could be a vehicle for reminding Iranians how much they hated the original Taliban and why they need to cooperate once again with the government of Afghanistan against a common enemy. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has invited Iran to dialogue on Afghanistan, and Tehran would benefit greatly.

On the security front inside Afghanistan, major changes must be made. First, there needs to be a major reinforcement of coalition forces and growth in the ANA. Second, we should concentrate on giving the army the enablers--fire support, helicopters, and logistics--that it needs to become more independent and expeditionary. The ANA should also be charged to arm and supervise local tribal guardsmen, who can serve as force multipliers. Over time, advising and mentoring the ANA--not fighting--should become the most important task of coalition forces.

Third, to streamline the chain of command, the clock should be turned back. While the ISAF commander remains in overall command, NATO ISAF should directly control the areas in the north and west, where peacekeeping and stability operations are the rule. An Autonomous Combat Command (ACC), a coalition of the willing with a separate warfighting headquarters, would conduct counterinsurgency and stability operations in the east and south. NATO and ACC units would be responsible for mentoring local ANA units in their respective areas of responsibility. A separate training and advisory command--again, a coalition of the willing--would support advisory efforts in both areas of responsibility and would manage security assistance to the ANA and ANP. (9)

Fourth, good counternarcotics operations will make for good counterinsurgency effects. Coalition military units should begin to gather intelligence in order to target drug lords, warehouses, and laboratories. The coalition should leave retail "poppy whacking" to the counternarcotics police.

Fifth, the government, coalition, and international community, including NGOs and major businesses, should establish a national coordination center in Kabul to plan and manage counterinsurgency, aid, and state-building activities. This center would have an operational level for planning and execution on various lines of operations, as well as a senior executive level that would meet monthly. Afghan government representatives should chair each of the multiple forums. Iran, Pakistan, and other regional states could maintain liaison officers at both levels. This center would bring all relevant actors to the table on security, governance, and economic development.