Afghanistan: the path to victory

Joint Force Quarterly, July, 2009 by Joseph J. Collins

Finally, long-range planners in the coordination center should begin transition planning. In each line of operation, they should define an endstate and a work plan to put Afghans in charge of their own country. One area ripe for participation is the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, which should ultimately become Afghan-led and coalition-supported.

We are not doing well in Afghanistan, but we could be back on a path to victory by the end of 2010. For our own security, we should stick to our commitments and pick up the pace of our efforts, fighting harder against the Taliban and working harder to help build a legitimate Afghan state. In the end, the most essential thing the coalition can do is to develop Afghanistan's capacity to secure its own country and to run its own affairs. We can help, but in the end, only Afghans can achieve victory.

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Notes

(1) ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll, "Afghanistan: Where Things Stand," December 2008, available at <http://abcnews.go.com/PollingUnit/ story?id=6787686&page=1>.

(2) See discussion in Russell Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), 5.

(3) Henry A. Kissinger, "A Strategy for Afghanistan," The Washington Post, February 26, 2009, A19.

(4) Unpublished testimony of Marin Strmecki before the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 26, 2009.

(5) Joseph J. Collins, "To Further Afghan Reconciliation: Fight Harder," Small Wars Journal, October 31, 2008, available at <http://smallwarsjournal. com/blog/2008/10/to-further-afghanreconciliati/>.

(6) Robert M. Gates, "A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age," Foreign Affairs 88, no. 1 (January-February 2009), 28.

(7) Author's private discussions with three senior Afghan national security officials, one in 2008 and two others in 2009, in Washington, DC.

(8) Presentation by a senior Afghan official in Washington, DC, in the winter of 2009.

(9) A fuller treatment on how to revise command and control in Afghanistan can be found in the unpublished testimony of Lieutenant General David Barno, USA (Ret.), before the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 26, 2009.

Colonel Joseph J. Collins, USA (Ret.), is Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College. A 30-year student of Afghan affairs, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations, 2001-2004.