Charting a new U.S.-Iraqi relationship

Joint Force Quarterly, July, 2009 by Thomas C. Greenwood, Kevin M. Woods, Michael P. Fischerkeller

President Barack Obama's February 27, 2009, speech at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, officially committed the United States to ending the war in Iraq. (1) After 6 years of fighting--with more than 4,000 Americans and many more Iraqis killed--the announcement was welcomed across America and around much of the world. He appropriately left the required mechanics to achieve his vision--a war termination strategy--to subordinates who are now drafting the necessary plans. This article seeks to crystallize a few guiding principles and ideas that may help them with this task. The central problem is how to demilitarize America's relationship with Iraq by 2011 without creating a strategic vacuum as U.S. forces are brought home.

Those who listened carefully to the President's words could not help but hear his cautionary notes about the challenges ahead. He rightly warned about "Iraq not yet being secure," "difficult days ahead," "likelihood of increased violence," and "a future of more danger, new tests, and unforeseen trials."

War Termination Begins

This was not public posturing or political hedging. Rather, the President was invoking Lincolnesque language to clearly and soberly convey what he and his closest advisors understand about ending a war--namely, that it is a fragile and difficult process, infinitely more complicated than beginning a war. (2) The President explicitly acknowledged as much when he divulged that "tactical adjustments" might be required in the future.

The President's speech did more than temper public expectations about the hard road ahead. Notably, he put forth a broad framework and political objectives to help guide policymakers who must now do the real work of crafting a detailed plan that strives to "operationalize" the President's vision. This requires mid-level government professionals to begin the arduous business of trying to match political goals to meaningful action on the ground. To say that the devil is in the details would be to trivialize the complex strategy development process that has earnestly begun in Washington, Tampa, and Baghdad. Figuring out how to end the war responsibly is paramount in that endeavor. (3)

Developing a Strategy

Fortunately, the President's speech provided explicit guidance in four key areas: he defined success, outlined how the nature of the U.S. occupation will transition during the next 3 years, committed the United States to a long-term relationship with Iraq, and announced the beginning of a new era in the Middle East by calling for a comprehensive regional approach to major issues. It is worthwhile to examine each of these in greater detail.

First, the President defined success in Iraq as more than simply bringing U.S. combat troops home by August 31, 2010, and withdrawing all remaining U.S. forces by the end of 2011. Granted, these dates grabbed the headlines, but before mentioning either, the President said:

This strategy is grounded in a clear and achievable goal shared by the Iraqi people and the American people: an Iraq that is sovereign, stable, and self-reliant. To achieve that goal we will work to promote an Iraqi government that is just, representative, and accountable, and that provides neither support nor safe-haven to terrorists.

The word democracy was not used in the speech, and the word peaceful was used primarily in an external context--how well Iraq gets along with its neighbors--rather than emphasizing internal security. This implies that stability is not necessarily an absence of violence--only of widespread violence that might cause mass casualties, undermine the central government's legitimacy, or rekindle civil war. In fact, the President pragmatically recast U.S. objectives in Iraq from an ambitious to a more modest level. He noted that Iraq will have to police its own streets, achieve its own political union (for example, political reconciliation), and ultimately take charge of its own affairs. While America seeks a lasting relationship, that relationship will no longer be one defined by an open-ended military commitment.

Second, the President described the U.S. role in Iraq as transitioning from a focus on combat operations to a focus on helping Iraqi leaders practice good governance. Iraq must develop legitimate institutions that do not depend on the United States; however, the President pledged "a strong political, diplomatic, and civilian effort on our part [that] can advance progress and help lay a foundation for lasting peace and security."

The process of shifting the main U.S. effort from security to governance began months ago. Nevertheless, the President emphasized that theme--noting that just as the United States has supported Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), it will continue to help strengthen Iraq's rule of law, fight corruption, and improve the delivery of basic services.

Third, the President spoke with conviction about America's long-term relationship with Iraq, stressing that the United States is not walking away. For example, he discussed how resolving the issue of refugees is a vital part of Iraq's reconciliation and recovery--one in which "America has a strategic interest--and a moral responsibility--to act ... provide more assistance and take steps to increase international support for countries already hosting refugees."