Social identity, the virtues, and the good life: a new approach to Romans 12:1-15:13

Biblical Theology Bulletin, Summer, 2003 by Philip F. Esler

This brings us to the area of ancient philosophical and social thinking with a direct bearing upon the form in which Paul casts his norms for the new identity, the Aristotelian interest in virtues and the good life.

The Resurgence of Aristotelian Notions of Virtues and the Good Life

Attempts, such as those of Stephen Barton and Wolfgang Schrage noted above, to create clear water between New Testament "ethics" and philosophical ethics (even if troubled by continued use the same term) derive much of their force from the fact that the latter field was, until quite recently, primarily concerned with determining the criteria for right and wrong actions by individuals. So circumscribed an emphasis stood in rather stark contrast with the rich diversity of text-forms and interests represented in the New Testament.

The philosophic traditions providing the foundation for much contemporary ethics were developed (at least until quite recently) almost entirely in the context of generating criteria for right and wrong actions, with (Kantian) deontology emphasizing duties or rules and uilitarianism emphasizing the consequences of actions. This led to the notable neglect of other issues, which seem to have great relevance for the New Testament, such as the motives for moral actions, moral character, moral wisdom or discernment, moral development, friendship and family relations, the role of emotions in the moral life, the meaning of happiness, and questions concerned with sort of persons we should be and how we should live (Hursthouse: 3).

In the last few decades, however, there has been a renaissance in the study of ancient Greek ethics which has seemed to many to offer a wider perspective on the subject, in particular by addressing issues such as those just mentioned, than has been the case for much of the modern period. Gisela Striker has isolated three factors in particular which account for the renewed enthusiasm for Greek ethics (169). First, Greek authors were usually interested in providing an account of the good life for human beings (which they called eudaimonia, happiness or human flourishing) as opposed to focusing narrowly on right or wrong action. Secondly, this wider scope led them to treat seriously the question of motives for morality, or reasons for wanting to be good--a question that is an embarrassment for much modern ethics, including Kantian and utilitarian theories. Thirdly, Greek philosophers tended to be concerned with virtues of character, which (pending a fuller treatment below) may be described as traits that underlie and explain a disposition to act in the right way, rather than with the principles of right action. This emphasis is particularly important because, as many believe, what people do tends to depend more on their character than on their knowledge of moral or legal rules. On this view we should study and seek to attain excellence of character, rather than becoming embroiled in debates about moral epistemology or ethical foundationalism. This emphasis on virtue over action connects naturally with the theme of the good life, since what a person regards as a good life will largely depend on what he or she desires, and desires are more closely linked to character than to reasoning.