Social identity, the virtues, and the good life: a new approach to Romans 12:1-15:13

Biblical Theology Bulletin, Summer, 2003 by Philip F. Esler

A particular topic taken up by Striker is how philosophy moved from the (classical Greek) view that ethical theories were theories about the good life to our understanding (dominant until recently) that the central ethical problem is "the justification of moral decisions or the foundation of moral rules" (170). To answer this question she traces central themes in the development of Greek eudaimonism, starting with its earliest manifestation in Socrates' question in the GORGIAS (How should we live to be happy? [472C-D]). Ethics understood as eudaimonism involved determining the ultimate end (telos) of human desire and action, to be called happiness or living well, and how best to achieve it. This study could and, in the hands of Plato (c. 429-347 BCE) and Aristotle (384-322 BCE), did proceed largely in the absence of any discussion of the criteria of right action. Yet this latter question nevertheless rose to prominence in the Hellenistic period, particularly in aid of explicating the meaning of just actions. Here the line of development passes from Epicurus to the Stoics, Carneades, Panaetius and Cicero. The central dilemma that emerged was whether happiness and virtue, the advantageous and the morally right, went together (as originally supposed) or could actually be in opposition with one another, as Carneades seems to have argued. The discovery of apparent conflicts between utility and virtue in the Hellenistic period unfortunately suggested that the pursuit of happiness and the path of virtue were distinct and separate. Since this time until about twenty years ago we have lived with the view that there is a sharp distinction between obtaining happiness (a question of non-moral utility) and moral considerations, which are concerned with a different sort of value unrelated to happiness (172-80).

The recent resurgence of interest in an ethics of virtue, which received an early stimulus in Elizabeth Anscombe's 1958 essay Modern Moral Philosophy and is especially seen in the warm reception accorded Alasdair MacIntyre's important work AFTER VIRTUE (1981), witnesses to the growing realization in philosophical circles that eudaimonism and moral theory should be seen not as rivals but as complementing one another. The pursuit of an ethics of virtue, of excellence of character as the key to right action, has, for example, flowed into business ethics, where it is now being increasingly recognized that the aim must be to make a business organization excellent at all levels and in all respects, so that its employees will do the right thing because that is simply its and their identity, rather than to insist on compliance with the regulations in corporate codes of ethics (Solomon).

What are virtues? Essentially they are dispositions of a certain kind. Here the word "disposition" means a certain capacity, tendency or propensity possessed by a person, or a liability to which he or she is subject. Dispositions tend to be stable and settled, in contrast to inclinations, which may come and go. Dispositions themselves narrate no incidents but, if true, are satisfied by narrated incidents in a person's life (Ryle: 119-20). They are frequently posited as explanations of past events in someone's life and grounds for the prediction of future events (Mumsford: 11). If, for example, a young man is said to have the disposition of clumsiness, that statement may be substantiated by narrating accidents in which he has been involved in the past, or to predict what might happen if he attempts to negotiate a path through an antiques shop crowded with towering piles of fragile china. In this sense, dispositions are close in meaning to traits of character. Yet a virtue is a disposition (or character trait) of a particular type, namely, one that makes its possessor morally good and contributes to his or her eudaimonia. Examples of virtues include honesty, generosity and courage. Thus a virtue is really an excellence of character.