Tracking the `Red Wolves of Radfan': from 1964 through 1967, the British tried to tame the badlands of Aden, now Yemen

VFW Magazine, August, 2002

Tommies of the British army called it a "punishment station." And from the time it became a colony in 1839, Aden--located on the southern end of the Arabian Peninsula--lived up to that reputation.

When the country got caught up in the Cold War, British troops were sent in to sort things out. The enemy then constituted two rival Marxist movements. But the combat conditions are not much different now than they were in the mid-'60s.

Two distinct campaigns were waged: one against urban terrorism, the other to combat desert nomads. Both proved equally frustrating. And each offer lessons for the American advisers currently operating in that inhospitable land.

The Radfan, 60 miles north of Aden city and 6,000 feet above sea level, is 400 square miles of desolation. Scorching (temperatures reach 150 degrees), almost waterless and roadless, the mountains were home to the Qotaibi tribe, self-described as the "Red Wolves of Radfan" because of their bloodcurdling practices, including beheading. Their stomping ground was the "Sacred Road"--the ancient caravan route from Aden via Dhala to Mecca--which they raided regularly. They numbered 7,500.

As one author put it, "Every male tribesman in the protectorate carried a gun. To go out without one was unthinkable. Shooting each other was their national sport." Combatants included a mix of "disciplined Marxist murderers, primitive tribal pursuers of the blood feud, teenage tearaways and dedicated nationalists"

One assessment of the "Red Wolves" concluded: "He will never surrender in battle and will endure shocking wounds, crawling away to die on his own rather than seek aid from his enemy."

The famed British Special Air Service (SAS) got a taste of tribal combat in April 1964. Two men of 3 Troop, A Squadron, were KIA at Shib Taym. After being decapitated, their heads were displayed on stakes in full public view.

The 3,000-man punitive expedition of which they were part included six major units and took five weeks to subdue the rebels, at least for the time being. In succeeding years, the British conducted brigade-size sweeps and blocking operations from a main forward base at Thumier. An SAS vet of Borneo called operating in the jungle "a gracious living" compared to the Radfan.

"Going up country"--the phrase for serving in the desert-mountains--was only part of the unpleasant duty assigned the troops. Patrolling Aden town was hazardous, too. Soldiers were limited to 90 minutes on patrol--after that, alertness and reaction time diminished appreciably.

These instincts were critical to survival. The last 60 minutes of daylight became known as "Happy Hour" because terrorists most often struck then. "Cairo Grenadiers"--Marxist grenade throwers--were particularly feared. Their deadly arena was called The Crater, the most densely populated area of the city.

It was there the covert anti-terror campaign centered. Regular and SAS units alike fielded clandestine plain-clothes personnel in the fetid alleyways. SAS called its outfit Keeni-Meeni (a Swahili term equating to a slithering snake). With a 20-man squad, teams of two or three men hunted would-be assassins in their lair.

Yet Britain's greatest single loss came not from terrorists, but uniformed troops. On June 20, 1967, the Aden Armed Force and South Arabian Police mutinied in The Crater. Eight men of the Royal Transport Corps died first in a truck ambush, followed by 12 soldiers of a 20-man patrol. By the time the killing stopped, 23 Tommies lie dead and 31 WIA. Many were shot numerous times.

Within five months, all 14,000 British troops (already scheduled to leave) were gone from Aden. Casualties (civilian and military) in the 1964-67 conflict totaled 382 killed (including 345 Arab terrorists and locals) and 1,714 wounded. Of this total, British servicemen sustained 57 KIA and 651 WIA (more than three-fourths in 1967 alone). Among the dead were six SAS soldiers. Terrorism also claimed the lives of 17 British civilians and wounded 81 more.

"In tribal eyes, the British withdrawal from Crater was a humiliating defeat" David Ledger wrote in Shifting Sands.

For the men on the ground, as usual, the lessons were clear. Without political will, a sympathetic populace, accurate intelligence, sufficient troop strength and a keen understanding of the enemy, the end results are easily predictable.

An SAS officer summed it up best: "We did not appreciate the intensity of the violence of the tribal reaction to our presence ... So often, we underrate the enemy." RKK