Network-centric operations: a need for adaptation and efficiency

Air & Space Power Journal, Spring, 2008 by Phillip G. Pattee

Finally, the DOD needs to adopt various new strategies on a trial basis with the idea of modifying themto suit emerging circumstances. The past tendency has involved running long series of experiments prior to implementing new doctrines, equipment, or strategies. Real and potential enemies, however, are already working to undermine rules and paradigms that donot suit them. Terror networks use their knowledge of social networks and information-age technology to avoid engaging strong Western-style militaries in traditional symmetrical warfare. Thus, terror networks have already mitigated some of the advantages that new systems such as the F-22 raptor create. The point is that prolonged experimentation may simply perfect a solution to yesterday's problem and remain only marginally effective against the problems currently emerging. The context for which a new system or strategy is designed is neither fixed nor linear--it constantly changes. While terrorists successfully expand their networks, US policy makers and planners remain stagnant; consequently, potential vulnerabilities develop and grow. The DOD must not only strenuously investigate technological solutions to problems but also examine social and political structures to understand them and find nontechnical ways to manage and enhance national security.

Conclusion

The DOD has mastered traditional military conflicts and is gaining efficiencies with its current networking initiative. However, it still lacks proficiency in the larger social domain that will lead to new combinations for enhanced security. We must educate military officers to think in terms of new combinations--the journey starts in the officer-education system. Adaptation will come much faster and more regularly with constant exposure to new ideas and perspectives. Variety in ideas and perspective emerges from a large social network. The DOD must expand its networking effort to guard against becoming a highly efficient but irrelevant force for national security.

Notes

(1.) Vice Adm Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Garstka, "Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future," US Naval Institute Proceedings 124, no. 139 (January 1998): 32.

(2.) Ibid.

(3.) David C. Gompert, Heads We Win: The Cognitive Side of Counterinsurgency (COIN), RAND Counterinsurgency Study, Paper 1 (Santa Monica, ca: RAND Corporation, 2007), ix, http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2007/RAND_OP168.pdf.> (4.) The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare (Washington, Dc: Department of Defense, Office of Force Transformation, 5 January 2005), 3, http://www.oft.osd.mil/ library/library_files/document_387_ncW_Book_lowres.pdf.

(5.) Ibid., 20.

(6.) Ibid., 21.

(7.) Ibid., 21-24. See also Joint Operations Concepts (Washington, Dc: Department of Defense, november 2003), 16, http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/ concepts/secdef_approved_jopsc.doc.

(8.) SSgt C. Todd Lopez, "F-22 Excels at Establishing Air Dominance," Air Force Link, 23 June 2006, http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123022371 (accessed 27 September 2006).