Range and persistence: the keys to global strike

Air & Space Power Journal, Spring, 2008 by Phillip S. Meilinger

Finally, we must consider the threat of enemy ground forces and terrorists. In Vietnam, Vietcong attacks destroyed 99 US Air Force aircraft and damaged another 1,170. (17) Sanitizing the area aroundUS facilities presents problems as well as possible tensions with host countries. the terrorist bombing of the Khobar towers in June 1996 resulted partly from Saudi Arabia's refusal to allow the extended defense perimeter necessary to ensure the barracks' safety. (18) We should also note that north Korea has 22 brigades of special forces who, in the event of war, will infiltrate the south and attack US/ South Korean air bases. (19)

Clearly, because overseas bases face numerous threats, we may not have access to them in future crises. The austere bases hurriedly established for operations Enduring freedom and Iraqi freedom were of a vulnerable, almost flimsy, nature. Aircrews and support personnel often lived in tents; aircraft, logistics facilities, and fuel supplies were similarly exposed. Enemy aircraft or missiles could have wreaked havoc there. We should assume that enemies in a future crisis will target our air bases. Will they survive and permit sustained combat operations? If not, then we will have an increased need for long-range strike assets.

Air Refueling

Air refueling became widespread in the 1950s, and during the vietnam War, most of the US strike aircraft that flew over north vietnam required it--essentially turning tactical fighters into strategic bombers. (20) But this dependence on aerial refueling presents problems. Our current tankers--the KC-10 and KC-135, based on commercial-airliner designs--are not stealthy and have no self-defense capability. Until now, this has not caused problems--we have never lost a tanker to enemy action. (21) How much longer can we guarantee this invulnerability?

Antiaircraft artillery (AAA) and SAM systems, a longtime bane of aircraft, have claimed far more US planes than have other aircraft. (22) Since World War II, air-to-air combat claimed only around 210 of the approximately 3,250 US Air Force aircraft lost in fighting--about 6.5 percent of the total. (23) AAA and SAMs are the real killers; unfortunately, a proliferation of new SAMs poses an enormous risk to our planes.

The most dangerous of these SAMs, the so-called double-digit missiles (SA-10, -12, and -20), have a "hit probability" of at least 90 percent against nonstealthy aircraft, making lowmaneuverability platforms such as tankers or airlifters especially vulnerable. (24) Russia, China, India, Iran, and Syria now field these SAMs. The SA-20, the newest and most capable foreign-made SAM system, is mobile, has a range of over 200 miles, can engage six targets simultaneously, and can be reprogrammed quickly. An upgraded version of this impressive system is already under development. (25) Even with heavy jamming and clever tactics, our nonstealthy fighters would find these missiles a very serious threat, and our tankers would not have a chance. In the air war over Serbia in 1999, the NATO air component commander remarked that his greatest nightmare was that somehow the Serbs would acquire an SA-10 or SA-12 battery. (26) Fortunately, they did not.