Valkyrie: North American's Mach 3 Superbomber

Air & Space Power Journal, Summer, 2005 by Dave Howard

Valkyrie: North American's Mach 3 Superbomber by Dennis R. Jenkins and Tony R. Landis. Specialty Press (http://www.specialtypress.com), 39966 Grand Avenue, North Branch, Minnesota 55056, 2004, 246 pages, $39.95 (hardcover).

The decade following the end of World War II witnessed a surge in aviation technology. Performance for fighter aircraft leaped from 450 mph to better than Mach 2. Missiles replaced guns as the main air-to-air weapons. Bombers showed dramatic increases in range, speed, and payload. The weapon systems hitting the drawing board in the mid-1950s continued this push for "higher, faster, and farther." We had high expectations for these next-generation aircraft--especially the B-70.

The B-70 Valkyrie was to be Strategic Air Command's crown jewel from the mid-1960s on. Cruising at altitudes above 70,000 feet and dashing towards the target at 2,000 mph, it would have created an extremely difficult threat for Soviet air defenses to counter. Because of cost overruns and the unforeseen success of ICBM technology in the late 1950s, however, the B-70 project transitioned into the XB-70 research program shortly after President Kennedy took office in 1961. This program yielded two airframes, the first flight occurring in September 1964. A spectacular midair collision in June 1966 killed two pilots and destroyed the second XB-70 as well as an F-104 chase plane. Subsequently, the flying program for the remaining XB-70 moved over to NASA in January 1967. The last flight of the XB-70 occurred in February 1969 when the delta-winged bomber arrived at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, to become part of the Air Force Museum's permanent collection. These are the bare facts; the truth is well told by authors Dennis Jenkins and Tony Landis.

Valkyrie follows the same successful format used by Jenkins and Landis in Hypersonic, their excellent book about the X-15 research aircraft: high-gloss, quality paper; detailed text well supported by illustrations; and lots of color and black-and white photographs. The book's 246 pages are divided into two forewords, a preface, eight chapters, and seven appendixes. The wealth of technical information throughout enhances the overall credibility of the work without overpowering the story. Approximately the first third of the book provides background information, and the remainder details the B-70. This layout effectively connects the B-70 to the Department of Defense's other advanced aircraft projects of the time.

As a cost-saving measure, engineers designed the B-70 to share systems with two other late-1950s programs under development concurrently: the nuclear-powered bomber and the Mach 3 interceptor. The authors devote a chapter to each of these projects as well as another chapter to high-energy fuels research. Readers could examine any of these chapters independently of the others with little loss of continuity (it's almost like getting four books for the price of one).

Jenkins and Landis cover all aspects of the B-70, from the drawing board to flight testing and retirement. They describe the political climate, together with the demise of the nuclear-powered bomber and the Mach 3 interceptor. The termination of these programs shifted huge additional system-development costs to the B-70 project and became a factor in its ultimate cancellation as a bomber and conversion to a research project. The well-documented flight program makes up a quarter of the book, including the midair collision of June 1966--unfortunately, the most memorable part of the B-70 program. Readers also learn about the various B-70 systems as well as the types of weapons it would have employed. Jenkins and Landis offer a detailed list of the 129 flights made by the XB-70s, photos of the men who flew them, commentaries from two of the principal test pilots, two pages of "interesting facts" from North American and General Electric press releases, good documentation, and an excellent index.

As a book about a nonoperational aircraft, Valkyrie will probably attract only a limited audience within the Air Force community. However, we would do well to heed its lessons about procurement, such as the sharing of subsystems and funding issues. Furthermore, concerns about the cost of weapon systems are just as valid today as they were in the 1960s. I found Valkyrie thoughtfully laid out, well written, and likely the last word on the B-70. To my knowledge, we have little other published information on the B-70 program. Therefore, a book of this quality should have strong appeal to aviation enthusiasts and historians alike. I look forward to more books by these authors.

Lt Col Dave Howard, USAF, Retired

Montgomery, Alabama