Post-Soviet Military Theory and Strategy: A Discussion of the Russian Journal Military Thought

Air & Space Power Journal, Summer, 2005 by Youssef Aboul-Enein

Post-Soviet Military Theory and Strategy: A Discussion of the Russian Journal Military Thought East View Publications (http://www.eastview. com), 3020 Harbor Lane North, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55447.

The Soviet Union has produced many notable military thinkers such as V. K. Triandafilov and Mikhail Tukhachevski, premier writers on the role of armor in combat. Others, like Aleksandr Svechin, who wrote on strategy, would fall victim to Stalin's purges. The Soviet dictator altered or simply destroyed many original Russian ideas on Clausewitz, thinking that they inspired German aggression in World War II. The fall of the Soviet Union liberated many archives, and original, uncensored works are beginning to appear in print. This review highlights issues for the year 2003 of the journal Military Thought, published monthly by the Russian Federation's Defense Ministry, in an attempt to provide insight into cutting-edge matters discussed by Russian military thinkers in the tactical and strategic realms. (Although originally published in Russian, Military Thought is available in English from East View Publications in Minneapolis.)

Col O. N. Kalinovskiy, Military Thought's chief editor, identifies five priorities for the themes of 2003: (1) forecasting the future character of wars in the twenty-first century; (2) searching for and discussing new forms and methods of warfare, C4I (command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence), logistics, and combat-service support; (3) exploring the interaction among agencies, military branches, and the joint performance of combat missions; (4) searching for effective ways of enhancing combat readiness, mobilization, and operational effectiveness, as well as discussing contract systems (outsourcing) techniques; and (5) reforming the system of military training. Furthermore, readers of Military Thought will expand their view of terrorism, combat training, and many other topics.

Lt Gen E. A. Karpov, Col G. A. Mokhorov, and Col V. A. Rodin lead off the January-February issue with an article entitled "International Terrorism and Its Military-Political Organizations," which describes such organizations as secret with concealed contacts and relations, as well as a tendency to make verbal agreements between leaders. Although scattered throughout the world, they nevertheless possess shared values. The authors note that the ideology of jihad has become the only part of Islam practiced by militants, who show little understanding of Islamic history or law and rely on clerics who impose their own interpretation of the faith. The article urges a direct assault on channels of funding as the quickest method to challenge and disrupt terrorist groups.

In the same issue, Col Gen A. S. Rushkin, chief of operations for the Russian General Staff, delves into the main factors of Russia's military reform in his article "On a New Configuration of the RF Armed Forces--Russian Federation." He highlights the need for a three-branch structure for land, air, and sea, as well as for combat operations having an interbranch (joint) character. Russia would maintain and employ nuclear forces only as a deterrent against large-scale or nuclear attacks against the homeland and its allies. General Rushkin also criticizes the old Soviet conscript system, arguing for a desperately needed professional armed force.

Each of the issues under discussion contains a section by Maj Gen Ivan Vorobyov, retired, Russia's premier military scientist and combined-arms theorist. Readers interested in tactical exercises will enjoy Vorobyov's remarks on the art of command and control, as well as offense and defense in different terrains. He also speaks of waging battles not necessarily for terrain or destruction of enemy formations, but for time, and of the Russian concepts of risk taking, in light of the fact that commanders cannot obtain all of the information they need before acting.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the journal is its coverage of the Academy of Military Sciences Council's session of 6June 2003, devoted to studying Operation Iraqi Freedom. "Lessons from the War in Iraq," by Maj Gen G. A. Berezkin, deputy of Russia's Defense Ministry Center of Military-Technical Information Studies, which appears in the May-June issue, shows a fixation on battlespace dominance provided by the U-2,JSTARS, and Global Hawk systems. In the same article, Lt Gen V. V. Barvinenko, deputy chief of the Military University of Air Defense, attempts to account for the poor performance of Soviet and Russian jets and air defense systems in Iraq, attributing air defense failures to overwhelming information superiority, air dominance, and effective command and control by coalition forces.

In this section, we see that Russia's preeminent military academics view the war in Iraq as American hegemony and make references to the NATO war of aggression against the Serbs over Kosovo. Despite 12 years of United Nations sanctions against Saddam Hussein, his previous deployment of chemical weapons, and mass genocide of Kurds and Iraqi Shia, authors like General Berezkin write that military action in Iraq represents the most clear-cut manifestation of the US military-political course in recent years. To them, it embodies the flagrant violation of all rules of international law to subdue a "rebellious" regional center of power and ensure Washington's unconditional hegemony in the world.