Adding less-lethal arrows to the quiver for counterinsurgency air operations

Air & Space Power Journal, Summer, 2008 by Ernie Haendschke

THE CONFLICT IN Iraq has enabled the war fighter to improve, and in some cases rewrite, many counterinsurgency (COIN) tactics, techniques, and procedures and has illustrated some gaps in our COIN capabilities. In this article, I explain one of those gaps in our weapons inventory and address how we resolved it to give Airmen two more weapons for supporting COIN operations. This discussion is as much about what we added to our inventory as how we added it.

In mid2007, the war fighter identified a need for a kinetic effect to engage insurgents in urban areas during troopsincontact engagements (a close air support [CAS] type of mission) while keeping noncombatant casualties to a minimum and allowing strikes near culturally significant or historical objects or sites. (1) Insurgents use such places as sanctuaries, negating the CAS kinetic option for certain target areas. The following description of how coalition forces identified and filled a COIN weaponscapability gap offers important lessons learned that validate the importance of having Airmen involved in planning and executing ground operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The discussion also reinforces the need for Airmen to continue their tradition of being innovative and agile as we improve our future combat capabilities across the spectrum of conflict.

Counterinsurgency Air Operations in Iraq

The Air Force has been involved across the spectrum of conflict in the Iraqi theater of operations for 18 years now. Highintensity strategic bombing campaigns took center stage during the opening weeks of operation Desert Storm and the opening days of the "shock and awe" campaign that toppled Saddam Hussein. During this period, the Air Force also spent years patrolling the skies over Iraq enforcing the nofly zones, providing humanitarian aid, and occasionally showcasing its precision-engagement capabilities when confronted with hostile intent according to the rules of engagement as part of operations Southern Watch and northern Watch.

The one constant throughout this period has been our air supremacy over the skies of Iraq. Not since 1991 have US service personnel had to wonder if the aircraft flying over them in Iraq are friendly or not. We cannot take this for granted, nor should we overlook it since controlling the skies factors into all air operations that currently support the conflict in Iraq. Future conflicts, even future COIN operations, may not allow us the same luxury, so we must remain prepared to fight to achieve control of the skies and thus allow freedom of action on the ground. Today in Iraq, our airpower is just as overwhelming and dominating--but in different ways due to the nature of the conflict.

We can best categorize the conflict after our invasion of Iraq in 2003 as irregular warfare (IW), which Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 23, Irregular Warfare, defines as "a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will." (2) This type of warfare has unique characteristics that require a different approach and associated strategies than the ones we trained in for traditional warfare. IW is characterized according to the activities required to conduct it. At its core lie insurgency and COIN.

* Traditionally the military has been reluctant to maintain its IW Doctrine--particularly true since the end of the Vietnam War. Prior to December 2006, the Army had not published a manual devoted exclusively to COIN for 20 years. The Marine corps had not published one for 25 years.3 Until 2007 the Air Force lacked official IW guidelines or Doctrine except for the area of foreign internal defense. We relegated IW Doctrine to the bottom of our priorities or even overlooked it for many reasons, including the following:

* It wasn't what we had trained for (i.e., it's not the kind of conflict the military wants to fight).

* It wasn't militarycentric (i.e., it involves much interdepartmental and interagency coordination).

* It was hard to justify bigticket, hightech hardware acquisitions that are the services' bread and butter (i.e., IW relies considerably less on the hightech hardware used in traditional war fighting).

* It is complex and difficult to successfully execute, so some people preferred to ignore it. (4)

These reasons reflect a mindset that focused more on previous, successful force-on-force conflicts within the military's comfort zone than on less than successful, messy, complex conflicts outside that zone. The US military has a mixed track record in this arena in Southeast Asia, latin American, and Africa. This myopic focus is now a thing of the past.

Since late 2003, the conflict in Iraq has highlighted this type of warfare and resulted in definitive actions. The Army and Marine corps codeveloped Field Manual (FM) 324 and Marine corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 333.5, Counterinsurgency, in December 2006, and the Air Force subsequently released AFDD 23 to help shape how the Air Force organizes, trains, equips, and sustains its forces for this type of warfare. This is all good and will ensure that future Airmen are ready for the challenges associated with IW operations and related activities, including COIN, support to COIN, counterterrorism, shaping and deterring, and support to insurgency. (5)