Cleared to engage: improving the effectiveness of joint close air support

Air & Space Power Journal, Summer, 2008 by Michael H. Johnson

Editorial Abstract: The importance of close air support (CAS) is greater now than in any of our most recent conflicts, dating back to Operation Desert Storm. Since the joint aspects of CAS are also magnified more than ever, crucial issues and deficiencies with joint doctrine and training highlight a glaring need for improvements in both arenas. The author proposes numerous, specific ideas for addressing these shortfalls for all services involved in joint CAS operations.

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THE TERM CLOSE air support (CAS) evokes scenes from the movie Platoon, in which a ground commander exhorts aircraft to "drop all remaining on my pos[ition]" to avoid being overrun by enemy forces. The mission has evolved into much more. Arguably the most difficult mission flown by aircraft on today's battlefield, CAS has remained at the heart of airpower debates for decades. (1) It requires the highest level of integration with ground forces, indirect fires, and other assets; furthermore, in most cases, CAS demands the greatest precision due to the proximity of friendly forces. (2) Finally, it has the highest potential for negative ramifications if something goes wrong, such as fratricide, civilian deaths, or the overrunning of ground forces.

The global war on terror has elevated the importance of CAS. Ground forces increasingly rely on the effects that airpower provides. The percentage of missions classified as CAS was small during Operation Desert Storm (6 percent) and Operation Allied Force (0) (because of the absence of terminal attack controllers on the ground in Kosovo). (3) In Operations enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, this percentage increased drastically. During Operation Anaconda, nearly all such missions supported ground forces in the Shah-e-Kot Valley. (4) During the push to Baghdad in 2003, 75 percent of Navy and Marine air involvement consisted of CAS missions. (5) According to the US Central Command Air Forces report entitled Operation Iraqi Freedom--By the Numbers, 79 percent of targets struck during the campaign fell under the kill-box interdiction/ CAS category. (6) In current Iraqi Freedom operations, almost all air missions require positive control to engage ground targets.

Recent combat operations have become increasingly joint in nature--for example, Air Force F-16 multirole fighters and Army AH-64 Apache helicopters provide CAS for Marine battalions, Marine AH-1 Cobra helicopters support Army brigades, and Navy F/A-18 multirole fighters support special forces. This increased joint interaction, coupled with service differences in the approach to doctrine and training, has decreased the effectiveness of CAS.

Joint Publication (JP) 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support, lists eight conditions for effective CAS: (1) effective training and proficiency, (2) planning and integration, (3) command, control, and communications, (4) air superiority, (5) target marking and acquisition, (6) streamlined and flexible procedures, (7) appropriate ordnance, and (8) favorable weather. (7) Doctrine and training affect all of these except air superiority and favorable weather. This article addresses ways to improve CAS effectiveness by focusing on doctrine and training.

Close Air Support Doctrine

CAS has its roots in the early decades of the twentieth century. The advent of the airplane quickly led to its application in strafing and bombing on the battlefields of europe in World War I. Marine aviators developed an early form of CAS in the Nicaraguan civil war of 1927. (8) Principles guiding these early uses of airpower in support of ground troops gradually matured through World War II, the Korean War, and Vietnam War into the doctrine we have today.

Service viewpoints on CAS diverged after World War II. Many Air Force proponents considered strategic bombing the primary role of airpower and viewed CAS as "a maximum waste of firepower." (9) The Army looked at airpower in terms of supporting a ground campaign. These perspectives continue within the two services in some form to the present day.

The underlying tension regarding the differing viewpoints on CAS affected interservice relationships and aircraft procurement throughout the 1960s. The Johnson-McConnell agreement of 1966 further delineated the Air Force's role as the sole provider of fixed-wing CAS to the Army while recognizing that Army helicopter missions included fire support. (10) Subsequently, in 1975 a letter outlined the Air Force's and Army's understanding of the use of airpower, shaping the latter's doctrinal stance on CAS. (11) Army leaders first used the term direct aerial fire support to describe helicopter CAS and attached a definition that would not antagonize the Air Force: "fire delivered by aerial vehicles organic to ground forces against surface targets and in support of land operations." (12) This evolved into "close in fire support" and, currently, "close combat attack." (13)

Viewing CAS through a much different lens, the Marine Corps approaches warfare by stressing combined-arms fires and aviation fires as integral parts of the overall plan. In 1935 the Corps established aviation as an independent section "primarily for the support of Fleet Marine Forces in landing operations and in support of troop activities in the field." (14) The Marine Air Ground Task Force construct includes an aviation element to provide fire support. This air-ground approach endured due to the use of a historically lighter force, with aviation fires providing the required support. Additionally, Marine aviation historically has focused on the tactical level. Having no strategic bombers, the Marine Corps has avoided the debate within the Air Force on the most efficient application of airpower. However, this contributes to problems with joint integration as Marine leadership constantly wrestles over the right mix of providing aircraft for a joint air campaign while maintaining the direct-support capability of Marine aviation.