A practical approach to effects-based operational assessment

Air & Space Power Journal, Summer, 2008 by Clinton R. Clark, Timothy J. Cook

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We can characterize the independent scores for performance and effect in three ways: (1) similar, (2) performance > effect, and (3) effect > performance. Similar scores suggest that the operation is proceeding as expected--that our understanding of the enemy system and the causal linkages between tasks and effects appears correct. In this case, we produce effects in proportion to the level at which we carry out subordinate tasks.

Disconnects between scores for effect and performance indicate that portions of the plan may require further examination. When performance scores are higher than effect scores, the completion of tasks, to this point, has not created the desired effects. Numerous issues--including data latency, delayed effects, or a misunderstanding of the enemy system--can drive such score mismatches. For example, we may have confirmation of successful leaflet drops (performance) supporting special-operations efforts to turn the local populace against the government (effect), but due to a communications outage we cannot receive reports of civilian uprisings (MOE). In addition, we may have battle damage assessment indicating destruction of all enemy fuel storage (performance), but we won't see how it affects enemy operations (effects) for two weeks. Finally, we may have destroyed all national power production (performance) to limit enemy command and control, but because the enemy employs couriers and handheld radios as his primary means of communication, command and control remains intact (effect).

In other words, our assumptions about direct links between the achievement of objectives and their prerequisite, lower-level effects and tasks may be flawed. In fact, the OA process may prove most valuable under these conditions. in this case, OA should focus primarily on quickly identifying and recommending required changes to the plan.

Conversely, when effect scores are higher than performance scores, we have produced desired effects without the comparable completion of subordinate tasks. Numerous issues, including data latency, enemy deception, good fortune, and a misunderstanding of the enemy system could lead to these score mismatches. for example, we do not have battle damage assessment from our strikes on the enemy's strategic SAMs (performance), but he has not launched them during the last five ATOs (effect). Further, although we haven't taken any action against enemy fighters (performance), the enemy has chosen not to fly. This situation may arise simply due to the fact that the enemy has hidden these aircraft in caves; regardless, our air operations have proceeded without inhibition (effect).

In this case, our potentially mistaken assumptions about task and effect linkages may enable a reallocation of resources. Identifying these opportunities will allow the JFACC to execute operations more efficiently. The OA team should now focus on identifying which objectives warrant additional resources and on determining operational risk (based on remaining enemy capability) assumed by the JFACC if resources shift to other objectives. Situations of high scores for effect with low scores for performance can quickly reverse themselves, for example, if the enemy brings his aircraft out of hiding.