The US national security strategy of 2002: a new use-of-force doctrine?

Air & Space Power Journal, Fall, 2004 by Arnel B. Enriquez

Editorial Abstract: Identifying terrorism as a distinct threat for the foreseeable future, the national security strategy of 2002 emphasizes preemption and prevention as a standard approach for dealing with that threat. This strategy produces a narrowly defined, controversial use-of-force doctrine that has many implications for the national military strategy.

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EVEN A CURSORY review of the national security strategy (NSS) of 2002 reveals a document vastly different from any of its predecessors. Although one may consider such a difference appropriate for the post-Cold War period, as the basis for subordinate strategies such as the national military strategy (NMS), it deserves close scrutiny. Such an examination will show that the NSS defines a strategic environment completely different from the one that existed just a few years ago--perhaps even unique. Therefore, the potential for equally significant changes in US military strategy demands a critical study of the effect of the NSS on a subsequent NMS.

Toward that end, this article addresses the implications of the NSS on the use of military force in pursuit of national objectives. This new doctrine appears far less cautious and more proactive than the so-called Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, which has dominated US strategic-security thinking to this point, by permitting the use of force in a preventive or preemptive manner against entities based simply on their hostile capabilities and generally hostile intent. Before discussing use-of-force doctrine and attempting to understand how use-of-force concepts in the NSS differ greatly from the previous use-of-force doctrines, one would do well to review the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine.

Review of Weinberger-Powell

Regardless of what one thinks of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, any discussion of the use of force must include it--partly because, so far, (1) Weinberger-Powell remains the most prominent attempt to capture, in a single articulation, a coherent basis for use-of-force decision making; (2) it continues to influence US strategic thought; and (3) the fact that Colin Powell serves as the current secretary of state ensures that the rationale underlying this doctrine will play directly in current and near-term US foreign policy. However, the evolution of the doctrine's name from "Weinberger" to "Weinberger-Powell" is extremely unfortunate because, although similar in form and foundation, the authoritative discourses by each of these gentlemen on this issue (a speech delivered by Weinberger in 1984 and a journal article written by Powell in 1992) differ in critical ways. (1) In other words, as one finds out later, they are not the same doctrine, Nonetheless, the terms Weinberger Doctrine and Weinberger-Powell Doctrine usually refer to Weinberger's original "six major tests," as is the case in this article. However, the term Powell Doctrine alludes to the principles laid out by Colin Powell in his article. In any case, a critical review of both statements provides a necessary foundation for further discussion.

Definition of Doctrine

First, though, any attempt to analyze, develop, and evaluate doctrine requires an understanding of what it is. Because the originator of the Weinberger Doctrine was a senior government executive, one may be tempted to equate it with presidential doctrines such as the Monroe or Truman Doctrines. However, presidential doctrines tend to treat foreign policy at the grand strategic level in that they identify national principles or objectives without specifying particular economic, political, or military strategies. In contrast, use-of-force doctrines by their nature focus on the military instrument of power. For example, even though President Truman's message to Congress in 1947, which defined his doctrine, asked for a specific amount of economic aid for Greece, the doctrine itself addressed the principle that "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures"; economic aid was merely a strategic action that supported this principle in the specific instance of Greece. (2) Furthermore, presidential doctrines are neither systematically formulated nor documented: one must extract the doctrines of Monroe and Truman from portions of their speeches; the full meanings of their doctrines have developed over time through the interpretations of others.

Although below presidential doctrine, strategic doctrine appears to reside above joint military doctrine, which consists of "fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application." (3) That is, joint military doctrine guides the consideration of how force should be applied--not the broader question of whether it should be applied. Use-of-force doctrines, then, appear to lie somewhere between presidential and joint doctrine: they are specific to the military instrument of power but should serve as guides that, coupled with the strategist's judgment, assist in determining if and how one should apply force as part of a military strategy.