Sharpening the eagle's talons: assessing air base defense

Air & Space Power Journal, Fall, 2004 by David P. Briar

Institutionally, the Air Force recognizes the significance of the asymmetric threat. Air Force Instruction (AFI) 31-101, The Air Force Installation Security Program, has this to say about the threat to air bases: "Asymmetric threats will increasingly challenge base defense forces. Historically, elements such as special forces, light infantry, airborne, airmobile, terrorist, guerrilla, and irregular units have successfully employed unconventional warfare tactics to harass personnel and destroy vital resources." (11) The word unconventional implies that adversaries will not likely charge headlong into a perimeter of infrared sensors, military working dogs, and manned fighting positions but will seek to disrupt Air Force operations by employing tactics that avoid formidable defenses. Consequently, standoff attacks--because they are least likely to encounter Air Force strength--represent the wave of the future in terms of asymmetric warfare.

Even the strike against the Khobar Towers housing complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, in 1996 qualifies as a standoff attack since the perpetrator never entered the legal limit of the installation, yet killed 19 Airmen. Moreover, al-Qaeda and the Taliban employ standoff rocket and mortar attacks in Afghanistan, as attested by Maj David Young, a security forces officer on the ground at Kandahar Air Base from December 2001 to March 2002, who reported four rocket attacks on the base. According to Young, the attacks were not effective but typify the enemy's attempt to find and expose gaps in base defenses. (12)

Doctrinal Overview

To determine whether Air Force security forces are capable of defending against the threat of attacks on air bases, one must move down the doctrinal ladder from basic air and space doctrine, through combat-support and force-protection doctrine, to base-defense doctrine. By doing so, one will discover not only the doctrinal and physical gaps, but also some other minor flaws in Air Force doctrine. The latter concern the difference between force-protection and base-defense doctrines. Even though it is fairly clear that base-defense activities designed to counter kinetic, ground-based threats are a subset of the wider group of force-protection operations, some Air Force documents confuse this point. According to AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine,

   air and space power is most vulnerable on the
   ground. Thus, force protection is an integral part
   of air and space power employments. Fixed bases
   are especially vulnerable as they not only must
   withstand aerial and ground attacks, but also
   must sustain concentrated and prolonged air activities
   against the enemy. This must be a particular
   focus of operations during peace support or
   crisis situations, when forces may operate from
   austere and unimproved locations, in small units,
   or in crowded urban settings and face threats to
   security from individuals and groups as well as
   possible military or paramilitary units. (13)

Air base defense, then, is a key element of all Air Force operations. The service considers base defense a part of its overall force-protection program--a combat-support function. AFDD 2-4, Combat Support, documents the importance of force protection and the doctrinal submission of base defense as a function of force protection: