On the German Art of War: Truppenfuhrung. . - Net Assessment - book review

Air & Space Power Journal, Winter, 2002 by Robert B. Kane

On the German Art of War: Truppenfuhrung translated and edited by Bruce Condell and David T. Zabecki. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. (http://www.rienner.com), 1800 30th Street, Suite 314, Boulder, Colorado 80301, 2001, 320 pages, $57.00.

Since 1945, many people have theorized why the German army of 1939 swept across Europe from September 1939 to mid-1942, with the retreat from Moscow in December 1941 as its only major setback, and then conducted a relatively orderly retreat from various fronts back to Germany from mid-1943 to April 1945. In 1948 Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz believed that the primary factor was the cohesion of the basic units of the German army of 1939. Later, Omer Bartov gave greater importance to the bolstering effects of Nazi ideology in keeping the average German soldier fighting and the army units together, despite the horrible combat conditions on the eastern front. Condell and Zabecki's book provides another fundamental reason for the German army's success in combat its operational and tactical doctrine, found in German Army Regulation 300, Truppenfuhrung [Unit Command], written in 1933-34.

An English translation of this field manual on combat operations is the heart of On the German Art of War. Truppenfuhrung represents the culmination of lessons learned from the army's operational experience in World War I, especially the shock tactics used in the offensive of March 1918, improvements through field exercises and maneuvers, and "General Staff" debate and discussion during the 1920s. Essentially, this manual is the equivalent of the US Army's FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations (1940); in fact, FM 100-5 drew heavily upon its German counterpart. In 1952 US Army Europe had several German generals, led by Franz Halder, formerly the German army's chief of staff, compare the two manuals. Their study, appendix E of On the German Art of War, revealed a strong correlation between the two.

James Corum's foreword and the editors' introduction cover the origins of the operational and tactical doctrine found in Truppenfuhrung from before World War I through the early 1930s, especially the influence of Gen Hans von Seeckt, army commander from 1920 to 1926. The introduction also summarizes the strengths and weaknesses of the doctrine found in the manual. As the editors write, "Its purpose was not to give German military leaders a 'cookbook' on how to win battles, but rather it was designed to give them a set of intellectual tools to be applied to complex and ever-unique warfighting situations" (p. 9). The introduction gives Truppenfuhrung a more favorable review than it warrants but still provides great back-ground into the manual's origins, theoretical basis, and impact.

From reading the manual itself, the reader gleans a number of major doctrinal themes. It reiterates the importance of communication among various command levels and emphasizes the need for combat leaders to follow orders, but it also encourages flexibility, depending on the current combat situation. Furthermore, the manual contains many references to airplanes and tanks--even devoting a full chapter to each, although such weapons were still in their infancy because of treaty restrictions following World War I. Finally, the manual envisions the German army division as a combined infantry/artillery unit with various other subunits (e.g., antitank, reconnaissance, and services) attached. This organization would enable German armies in the Soviet Union to combine and recombine subordinate units into effective battle groups as the war of attrition devastated larger army units and then conduct a generally orderly retreat from the eastern front. Of special note are the many references to horse cavalry--the subject o f a separate chapter--and horse-drawn artillery. (Despite progress in motorization, the German armies involved in Operation Barbarossa still required 500,000 horses.)

On the German Art of War is a must read for anyone with either a professional or casual interest in German military history, especially those who wish to understand how the German army enjoyed such success at the operational and tactical levels of warfare in World War II. It also provides some understanding of why the German army produced great field commanders, such as Erwin Rommel. At the same time, given the great effort expended on the operational and tactical levels of warfare, the German army of the 1930s produced only a handful of senior army commanders with a true knowledge of the strategic level of war. Although the reader can find occasional references to Clausewitz in Truppenfuhrung, as well as indications of his influence on that document, the focus of the manual--and, therefore, that of German military education, training, and army leaders--is the actual conduct of combat at the lower levels of warfare. Unfortunately for Germany in both world wars, success at the strategic level of warfare matter ed more than success at the operational and tactical levels.