Hit to Kill: The New Battle over Shielding America from Missile Attack & The Phantom Defense: America's Pursuit of the Star Wars Illusion. . - Net Assessment - book review

Air & Space Power Journal, Winter, 2002 by Kenneth P. Werrell

Hit to Kill: The New Battle over Shielding America from Missile Attack by Bradley Graham. Public Affairs (http://www.publicaffairsbookscom), 250 West 57th Street, Suite 1321, New York, New York 10107, 2001, 464 pages, $27.50.

The Phantom Defense: America's Pursuit of the Star Wars Illusion by Craig Eisendrath, Melvin A. Goodman, and Gerald E. Marsh. Praeger Publishers (http://auburnhouse.com/praeger.htm), 88 Post Road West, Westport, Connecticut 06881-5007, 2001, 190 pages, $24.95.

Following World War II, the United States and Soviet Union pursued ballistic missile defense (BMD), an effort America continued after the collapse of its arch rival. Thus far, BMD has generated high hopes and much cost but has delivered little militarily; at the same time, it has created unprecedented criticism. (One positive effect was the role that President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative played in the implosion of the Communist superpower.) The demise of the Soviet Union and the subsequent reduction of a nuclear threat have not dampened the American quest for BMD. On the contrary, at the moment, the United States is engaged in the broadest and most concerted effort yet attempted to produce defenses against ballistic missiles. If successful, such a defense will reorder strategic thinking. Regardless of success or failure, it will carry a considerable financial and political price. Therefore BMD is an important issue that will affect the military, country, and world order; clearly, it deserves the gr eat number of books and studies thus far published.

One problem for any student or author concerned with this subject is the fast-moving pace of events. Both books under review talk about 11 September 2001, but events have moved forward rapidly since then. Both mention President George W. Bush's intentions but not his decision to abandon the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the agreement to further reduce US and Russian strategic nuclear weapons, Russia's entry into NATO as a junior "partner," or the massive increase in US military spending, particularly on BMD. Be that as it may, both books are important to the discussion because they collect the story in an easily accessible form.

Bradley Graham's study is a detailed narrative based on interviews with top decision makers, including former president Bill Clinton and current president Bush. The author gives adequate background and then focuses on the last 10 years of the story, primarily the Clinton legacy. He handles the technology well but is strongest when dealing with the political process and the players. The principal problem of Hit to Kill is its length--the story is literally buried in detail. This flaw is more annoying than fatal and is more than offset by Graham's major strength--his balance. Hit to Kill comes close to the center on this issue, a trait that sharply contrasts most of the writings on this subject. As Graham correctly observes, BMD "has aroused a fervor akin to clashes over theology. There is an almost religious ferocity to the intense partisan political wrangling, and religious terms are often invoked. Proponents talk of the morality of erecting a national defense. Opponents speak of the sanctity of the ABM Trea ty" (p. xxxi). How true.

This type of emotion shows clearly in The Phantom Defense, which does not attempt to be evenhanded. It is a lawyer's brief for BMD critics, featuring the most notable of them, MIT professor Theodore Postel, described in the acknowledgements as "perhaps the nation's foremost authority on national missile defense" (p. xi). (An appendix includes three critical letters he wrote to the White House.) The book is hard hitting, sprinkled with some very harsh language. Eisendrath, Goodman, and Marsh do not disguise their views, writing in the introduction that "national missile defense, proposed against an exaggerated threat, incapable of being effectively deployed, destructive of arms control agreements, and likely to provoke a new arms race, destroys the national security it is designed to enhance. It is irrational as a policy, and inappropriate as a reward for self interested groups" (p. xix). The authors are clear in what they espouse: multilateralism, arms control, and diplomacy.

Both books are detailed, yet students of the subject will be disappointed by their lack of scholarly apparatus. Graham provides citations (of a sort) for some (but not all) of his writing, a practice that is inadequate due to the considerable number of direct quotations. He does not include a bibliography. The Phantom Defense has no citations but does offer excellent and extensive bibliographic materials. Both cover the various perils of BMD (cost, feasibility, effect on allies, and a potential arms race). Nevertheless, for all their detail, neither discusses several important issues. Critics of BMD state that because deterrence has worked in the past, it will work in the future. The first assertion is true, albeit mainly against one superpower, but the second is questionable. If Hitler had possessed nuclear-tipped V-2s in 1945, would he have been deterred? If coalition forces had closed on Baghdad in 1991 and Saddam Hussein had had ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads, would he have been restraine d? The books also fail to mention preemption, an alternative approach for dealing with a hostile power armed with nuclear ICBMs. What are the implications of such a policy? A third issue almost never mentioned by any authors, certainly not by critics, is that without BMD, countries armed with nuclear ICBMs could inhibit the actions of the United States. Is this why some countries, especially poor third world countries, spend precious resources procuring ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons? Graham briefly mentions this consideration, but Eisendrath, Goodman, and Marsh do not.