The tale of the C/JFACC: a long and winding road

Air & Space Power Journal, Winter, 2004 by Stephen O. Fought

The loop was now complete--there existed a forged concept of operations (EBO), a mechanism (AOC), and an organizational structure (JFCOM/ACC) through which airpower could merge into the joint fight on an equal footing with land and sea warfare. Perhaps coincidentally (but perhaps not) the two great air powers--the United States and the United Kingdom--reached the same conclusions, albeit via different paths.

Implications and Conclusions

At this point, it is reasonable to propose that airpower had run the gamut of attempts at organizational change and had finally become institutionalized. The seeds planted by Billy Mitchell and others at the beginning of the century, which grew so naturally in the United Kingdom under the care of Air Marshal Trenchard, had finally taken root in the United States. They first sprouted in the Solomons, in the face of a looming disaster and shortage of resources, but withered in the drought of demobilization. Over time, culminating in the abject failure of Vietnam, even airpower advocates admitted that something was terribly wrong--with the US military structure and most certainly with airpower. Then a powerful outside force, through the instrument of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, forced change. The world saw the net result in the joint warfare of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom--and it was awesome.

In the end, having traveled a long and winding road to achieving unity of command/effort for airpower, the Air Force has three responsibilities on the horizon--three major-league tasks that will prove crucial to institutionalizing these hard-fought changes. First, the mechanical aspects of the C/JAOC have to work. Second, we must populate the C/JAOC with well-trained individuals who are properly organized, trained, and equipped (and attuned) to the JFC's requirements. Finally, we must share the C/JAOC with our joint/ coalition/alliance partners.

Mechanics

If EBO is the framework for synergy at the JFC level and if the AOC (C/JAOC) is the Air Force's method of achieving unity of command/effort, then assessment is the linchpin that keeps the mechanisms moving together. Otherwise the system comes apart, and the C/JAOC defaults to the earlier ATO system of mindlessly servicing an endless target list with a finite set of resources. The crux is that assessment of EBO is very difficult--wholly different than the traditional problem of conducting battle damage assessment (BDA). BDA is a static measure taken instantaneously (e.g., photo recce, etc.); either a target is damaged (to a specified degree) or it is not. As a dynamic process, EBO lends itself better to trend analysis (i.e., measurement and evaluation over time). Further, it is likely to be multidimensional. Unlike observing craters, collapsed areas, or other damage following attack on a revetment or runway, evaluating effects involves a wide range of considerations. The latter include whether or not military operations have succeeded in eliminating (or reducing) an adversary's ability to maintain the support of the army, the relative cohesion of local political leaders, or even the continuity of the internal power grid. The bottom line is that we must channel much intellectual energy into figuring out how to conduct assessment in order to keep the C/JAOC cycle moving.