Operation Iraqi Freedom: coalition operations

Air & Space Power Journal, Winter, 2004 by Sophy Gardner

Editorial Abstract: The overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime during the combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom between March and May 2003 marked the culmination of many years of cooperation between US and British forces in the Middle East, brought together for Operation Desert Storm and remaining for 12 years policing the northern and southern nofly zones over Iraq side by side. In this article, the author attempts to identify the issues and challenges posed by coalition operations in Iraq as a way of understanding how to maintain and best nurture the close professional military relationship that exists between the US Air Force and the Royal Air Force as we look, collectively, to the future.

**********

IT IS JUST 22 months since the US-led coalition entered the final planning phase in the run-up to Operation Iraqi Freedom. At the time, the debate was raging about whether the United States was going to be forced to "go it alone." (1) In a press briefing on 11 March 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said that the United States had alternative plans to invade Iraq if Britain decided not to take part in military actions, adding, "To the extent they [Britain] are not able to participate, there are works around and they would not be involved." (2) In the United Kingdom (UK), the prime minister was facing significant opposition from within the Labour Party and from the general public, with demonstrations in London in mid-February 2003 drawing an estimated (and record) one million people. These political problems created a febrile atmosphere in the run-up to a potential operation (and gave US military planners a task that, to say the least, was extremely challenging). Nevertheless, it was widely recognised that the United States would attract greater international legitimacy if it could form a coalition, particularly if this could be garnered under United Nations (UN) auspices. (3) Also, the UK military contribution on the table, though small in relative numbers, provided some capabilities which were particularly valuable and included key top-up forces in areas where the United States was stretched. (4) Going it alone was certainly not the preferred course for the United States. (5)

Of course, Iraqi Freedom was ultimately conducted as a coalition operation, with troops from the United Kingdom and Australia in combat alongside the US military. But no UN mandate was forthcoming. In the aftermath of combat operations, military commentators lined up to analyse the operation, its perceived successes and failures, and the lessons that could be learnt for the future (not least in the context of the operation as a coalition enterprise). As the British chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) said, "As an example of a coalition operation in modern times, it [the operation in Iraq] has just about everything for the analysts to scrutinise and the armchair generals to comment about." (6) The aim of this analysis is to identify the issues and challenges that coalition operations presented during phase three of Iraqi Freedom and extrapolate from these the wider lessons which we need to identify if we are to move forward in order to prepare ourselves for future coalition operations. But firstly, five caveats. I intend to concentrate on the UK/US relationship, despite the fact that there was also a considerable Australian presence--around 2,000 personnel, comprising elements such as special forces, commando units, FA/18s, frigates, and a diving team, as well as a national headquarters similar to, though smaller than, the UK National Contingent Headquarters (NCHQ) at Camp As Saliyah in Qatar (alongside US Central Command [CENTCOM] Forward). The Australians will have their own perspective, although they may well have similar observations on the challenges of participation in this coalition endeavour. Indeed, there were many more layers of complexity to the "coalition" context of this operation, given the dozens of other nations that were involved in some way (whether in providing overflight rights, basing rights, or logistic support). (7) Secondly, in order to address the subject holistically, I will look at the operation from the joint perspective. But, where possible, I will tease out some air-specific issues and examples, and later consider the evolving United States Air Force (USAF)/Royal Air Force (RAF) relationship in the aftermath of Iraqi Freedom. Thirdly, I will focus specifically on lessons from phase three (the combat phase that culminated in the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime--"the conventional combat portion"). (8) At the time of this writing, it is plain that phase four--still ongoing--has many further lessons for us, but, nevertheless, there is still much to be gained by analysing phase three and the preparations for it as a discrete package. Fourthly, it is also important to acknowledge the implications that the refusal of Turkish support had for the UK experience. Apart from the obvious time-critical challenges of the late decision to abandon the possible use of Turkey and the necessary redirection of significant quantities of troops and equipment, the demise of the "Turkey option" took US European Command (EUCOM) out of the command and control (C2) equation. Having both CENTCOM and EUCOM in the operation would have added an extra dimension, and an already complex situation would have been even more so. Thus the investigation of coalition operations here, by definition, considers coordination and cooperation with only a single US command headquarters. Finally, it is important to recognise that "what you see depends on where you sit" (here I quote the UK national contingent commander [NCC]), (9) and my perspective will no doubt be shaped in part by my experience at the NCHQ.