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Clausewitz and the Falkland Islands Air War
Air & Space Power Journal, Winter, 2006 by Norberto Bergallo, Carlos Raul Gorgono Gutierrez, Rodolfo Pereyra
As a professor of strategy at the Argentine Air Force Academy, I used Maj Rodolfo Pereyra's article "Clausewitz and the Falkland Islands Air War" (Fall 2006) as a reference because one of the strategy course's principal themes is the study of the Prussian general and his classic work On War. That study topic is of the utmost importance these days if we are to achieve the full grandeur of the profession of arms in the Americas.
Col Norberto Bergallo
Buenos Aires, Argentina
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Major Pereyra's excellent article brings us closer to the truth of why Argentina was defeated in the Malvinas War. Therefore, for personal reference, I would like to find out if, based on this article, I can say that Argentina should have applied Mahan's theory (i.e., control the sea) and discarded the German land-warfare theory that Argentina's Gen Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri used to fight the Malvinas War.
Prof. Carlos Raul Gorgono Gutierrez
Buenos Aires, Argentina
Editor's Note: Colonel Bergallo and Professor Gorgono read the Spanish version of Major Pereyra's article, available at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2005 /1tri05/pereyra.html.
CLAUSEWITZ AND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AIR WAR: THE AUTHOR RESPONDS
If Mahan's theory applied to anyone in the South Atlantic conflict, it certainly was not Argentina but Great Britain and its Royal Navy. For Great Britain, losing the Malvinas Islands meant losing a strategic point in the South Atlantic that affected three factors which supported national power: political, economic, and military. However, for Argentina, regaining the islands meant reestablishing its sovereignty; it did not reflect an expansionist desire for power.
However, if you are referring to the reasons why Argentina lost the war, I agree with you. Poor strategic planning to defend the islands was the reason. After the Argentines changed their political objective to "occupying to negotiate" and decided to face the Royal Navy's attack, they neither properly analyzed enemy capabilities nor developed and adopted an adequate course of action.
The Argentine navy's order of battle was not fit to confront the naval and aerial war that British admiral Sandy Woodward was preparing. However, the Argentine navy could have kept the lines of communications open between the continent and the islands in order to logistically support all the aerial units deployed to the islands. The naval staff should have taken the necessary measures to allow the largest possible numbers of air units to operate from the islands so that the air component could have kept the Royal Navy at arm's length from its target.
In order for Argentina to keep the lines of communications open, it needed to concentrate on locating and destroying British submarines. Multirole aircraft based on the continent and the islands could have screened the naval operation from aerial threats. Meanwhile, Argentine airpower based on the islands could have fended off any tactical and/ or strategic bombing and assailed the British fleet, preventing it from approaching within its weapons' range, let alone conducting an amphibious landing.
A long campaign that produced casualties without achieving desired objectives would have been counterproductive to the political and economic interests of the British government, which might have avoided armed conflict and sought diplomatic solutions. In view of this situation, a British amphibious landing on the continent might have been an alternate course of action, but in view of the global context, maybe it would have had other implications that would have produced a new topic to analyze.
Maj Rodolfo Pereyra
Santa Bernardina Air Base, Uruguay
COPYRIGHT 2006 U.S. Air Force
COPYRIGHT 2008 Gale, Cengage Learning
