Air-minded considerations for joint counterinsurgency doctrine

Air & Space Power Journal, Winter, 2007 by Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.

Editorial Abstract: According to the author, the recent publication of Army Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, reflects a distinctly "surface-minded" perspective. Since airpower possesses unique capabilities, such as speed, range, flexibility, and persistence, he proposes exploiting these "air-minded" viewpoints to enlarge and enhance what is currently a service-centric doctrine. General Dunlap suggests that doing so would produce a much-improved and well-rounded joint approach.

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What Would joint counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine that includes "air-mindedness" look like? The Army and Marine Corps have issued COIN doctrine--Field Manual (FM) 324 / Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 333.5, Counterinsurgency--that clearly articulates what one might call a "surface-minded" perspective. (1) unfortunately, that doctrine relegates airpower to a five-page annex in a 282-page document. However, an effort is now under way to draft joint COIN doctrine that, presumably, not only will include a full exploitation of airpower per se, but also be informed by an air-minded perspective. (2)

"Air-minded" does not mean "air-centric" or even dominated by air, space, and cyberspace power. Rather, one should look to Gen henry H. "Hap" Arnold's use of the term to characterize an Airman's "particular expertise and ... distinctive point of view." (3) According to air Force doctrine, an airman's "perspective ... is necessarily different; it reflects the range, speed, and capabilities of aerospace forces, as well as threats and survival imperatives unique to Airmen." (4)

Air-mindedness actually means more than that. It includes, for example, an airman's predilection to especially value technology when seeking advantages over enemy forces. it reflects an airman's desire to avoid the carnage of ground-force engagements wherever possible. Moreover, whereas soldiers and marines may seek the "close fight," airmen look for opportunities to obtain the desired effects from long distance--that is, without giving the enemy the opportunity to close. Properly applied, an air-minded approach provides many opportunities to create what COIN experts Steven Metz and Raymond Millen say is needed to win: an "effects-based approach designed to fracture, delegitimize, delink, demoralize, and deresource insurgents." (5)

Providing a full-blown draft doctrine lies well beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, one may identify some considerations that an airman might bring to the development of joint COIN doctrine, as outlined in the following examples. (6)

Exploit the Psychological Impact of Contemporary American Airpower on Adversaries

As thorough a job as FM 324 / MCWP 333.5 does in reviewing previous conflicts involving nontraditional adversaries, it does not incorporate the implications of the psychological dimension of today's airpower. This is not a discussion about the much-debated effect of airpower on civilian morale but about how current precision capabilities influence the morale of combatants. it concerns the targeting of insurgents' "hearts and minds." (7) Understanding how airpower drove the Taliban and their al-Qaeda allies from power in Afghanistan, for example, is essential to designing the effective use of the air weapon in future COIN operations.

Accomplishing this feat proved a considerable challenge. Afghanis, numbered among the world's most fearsome fighters, have enjoyed that reputation for thousands of years. The Soviets sought to tame them with an enormous application of raw combat power but ultimately failed. Yet, the united States managed to oust the Taliban and al-Qaeda from power in a matter of weeks. How? By inflicting helplessness as only the newest developments in airpower can.

Technology that the Soviets did not possess in the 1980s enabled airpower's decisiveness in the downfall of these adversaries. Russian aviators had neither the sensor suite nor the precision technology of today's US airpower. Typically, Soviet pilots had to fly low enough to acquire their targets visually, which caused devastating aircraft losses once the mujahideen acquired American-made Stinger antiaircraft missiles. (8) Although the Russians devised various tactics to counter that threat, the missiles eventually forced them to the safety of higher altitudes that, in turn, caused accuracy and combat effectiveness to suffer. (9)

Unlike Soviet airpower in the 1980s, that of the United States in the twenty-first century can inflict devastating, highly accurate attacks not only by tactical aircraft, but also by heavy bombers flying at altitudes that rendered the Taliban's already meager air defense completely ineffective. According to Gen Tommy Franks, USA, retired, the newly acquired linkage of ground-based controllers to "B-52s orbiting high above the battlefield had proven even more lethal than military theorists could have imagined." (10) Enemy forces in long-held positions often never saw or heard the plane that killed them. This new-style air onslaught rapidly collapsed enemy morale and resistance.