Air-minded considerations for joint counterinsurgency doctrine

Air & Space Power Journal, Winter, 2007 by Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.

Maximize Airmen's Expertise in Cyberspace and Information Operations

Cyberspace--the "physical domain within the electro-magnetic environment"--is the newest entry in airpower's portfolio. (30) The Air Force has established a cyberspace command aimed at maintaining not only dominance in communications and information technology, but also "superiority across the entire electro-magnetic spectrum." (31) Given the "inherently technical ... nature" of cyberspace operations, it fits naturally with the culture of Airmen. (32)

Moreover, cyber operations are a direct expression of an air-minded approach. As the Air Force's doctrine on irregular warfare points out, "like air operations, cyber operations can strike directly at nodes of interest." (33) Properly executed, cyber operations minimize the enemy's opportunity to inflict casualties that might otherwise result from close combat.

Consequently, in perhaps no other area are the antitechnology views espoused by some individuals more off target. (34) Actually, in the cyber arena, high tech is both central to twenty-first-century peer-competitor conventional war and one of the most revolutionary features of putatively "low-tech" contemporary COIN environments. Max Boot points out that Islamist insurgents rely heavily on information technologies that "barely existed in 1980." (35) Gen Ronald Keys, USAF, retired, former commander of air Combat Command, provides more detail: "The terrorists are using cyberspace now, remotely detonating roadside bombs. Terrorists use global positioning satellites and satellite communications; use the internet for financial transactions, radar and navigation jammings, blogs, chat rooms and bulletin boards aimed at our cognitive domain; e-mail, chat and others providing shadowy command and control [C2]; and finally overt and covert attacks on our servers." (36)

Airmen work to place an "'information umbrella' over friends and foes alike." (37) Although one encounters legal constraints in many areas regarding what one may do in cyberspace, such restrictions may prove less of an issue in Iraq. Lt Gen Abboud Gamber, Iraqi commander of the Baghdad security effort, declared that under Iraqi law, the government could "search, control, and seize all parcel post, mail, telegraphs, [and] communication devices as needed." (38)

Integral to cyberspace capability are information operations (IO), which Airmen, especially in the air Force, consider a "key operational function" of their component. (39) Thus, an air-minded approach would look for opportunities to exploit technological means to "influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp" the unconventional kinds of C2 systems used by insurgents. (40) Cyber operations may present opportunities to limit the vulnerability of US troops. As one of its central means of assisting the host-nation population, FM 324 / MCWP 3-33.5 advocates a "clear-hold-build" strategy that requires COIN forces to "eliminate insurgent presence" in selected areas, followed by efforts to keep the location secure and rebuild host-nation institutions. (41) Unfortunately, these clearing operations are very high risk. To minimize that risk, one might do better to focus on the "build and hold" portions in more benign and cooperative areas.