Air-minded considerations for joint counterinsurgency doctrine

Air & Space Power Journal, Winter, 2007 by Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.

That said, one may need an aggressive air-minded approach to prevent "uncleared" areas from becoming electronic C2 sanctuaries. One author offers an "extreme proposal" perhaps worth considering: "to completely shut down the information technology grid in the insurgent areas--telephones, cellular towers, and so on." (42) The proposal raises complex issues but does have the attractive feature of being virtually casualty free.

For Airmen, IO includes influence operations (although they are separate from traditional public-affairs functions). (43) Unfortunately, the united States has enjoyed little success in this area. In January 2007, the title of a Newsweek article accurately noted that the United States is "Losing the Infowar" in Iraq. (44) Granted, this difficulty is not a new one, but the fact that the insurgents are exploiting technology to defeat American efforts (as General Keys also noted) is especially frustrating. (45) Specifically, Newsweek observes that "insurgents using simple cell-phone cameras, laptop editing programs and the Web are beating the united States in the fierce battle for Iraqi public opinion." (46)

As suggested above, one can take extreme measures to deny insurgents access to or use of these technologies. Some situations, such as an unauthorized television station broadcasting from within Iraq, ought to be relatively easy to interdict technically (although it has evidently proven difficult). (47) This particular station's anti-American invective has made it the "face" of the insurgency within Iraq, so shutting it down would clearly benefit the COIN effort and would seem to be in keeping with democratic values. (48)

In any event, this may be the only way to control enemy propaganda that is dangerously inciting violence in certain areas. If we take such action, we might use a low-tech air-power means (e.g., air-delivered leaflets--a technique used successfully in Iraq in the past) to partially replace information that the host-nation population in the affected area would lose. (49) Additionally, Commando Solo aircraft can broadcast appropriate messages to otherwise denied areas. (50)

Utilizing military deception at this point in operation Iraqi Freedom would prove more problematic. Although such deception remains an internationally accepted means of warfare, one must take care to ensure it complies with US and Iraqi law, as well as the political aims of both countries. (51) Still, COIN expert Bard O'Neill advises that "propaganda and disinformation campaigns" to discredit insurgent leaders can be effective. (52)

Again, this idea is not especially new. Back in 1995, Thomas Czerwinski, then a professor at National Defense University's School of Information Warfare, postulated one scenario: "What would happen if you took Saddam Hussein's image, altered it, and projected it back to Iraq showing him voicing doubts about his own Baath Party?" (53) If it can be updated effectively to apply to today's insurgent leaders in Iraq, the concept deserves careful consideration.