To bomb or not to bomb? Counterinsurgency, airpower, and dynamic targeting

Air & Space Power Journal, Winter, 2007 by Jason M. Brown

Notes

(1.) Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-1.9, Targeting, 8 June 2006, 114, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/afdc privateweb/AFDD_Page_htML/Doctrine_Docs/AFDD21 9.pdf.

(2.) James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003), 428-30.

(3.) Field Manual (FM) 3-24 / Marine corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, December 2006, 47, http://usacac.army.mil/cac/repository/materials/COINFM324.pdf.> (4.) David S. Cloud, "The Reach of War: U.S. Airstrikes on Increase to Aid NATO in Afghanistan," New York Times, 17 November 2006.

(5.) Ed Blanche, "Hammering Hamas," Middle East, December 2003, 28-31.

(6.) These include the AGM-114P Hellfire missiles, the 250-pound GBU-39 small-diameter bomb, or the venerable AC-130 gunship with its suite of direct-fire cannons.

(7.) Benjamin Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror: America's Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom (Santa Monica, CA: RAND corporation, 2005), 350.

(8.) Senator John McCain defines "whack a mole" in the context of Iraq. "transcript for Aug. 20: John McCain, Barry McCaffrey, Vali nasr, John harwood," Meet the Press, 20 august 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14390980 (accessed 20 February 2007).

(9.) Commanders and planners who influence and/or direct dynamic targeting in counterinsurgency operations are often located in multiple components at the operational or tactical level--or both. This article does not argue for specific command relationships in these situations, but it does argue for the importance of effective collaboration. It also does not explore which level--operational or tactical--is more appropriate to conduct these operations. Overall, we must often carry out many functions at the operational level, but commanders should delegate as many of them as practical to the tactical level in order to attain the necessary operational tempo needed to fight insurgents.

(10.) AFDD 2-1.9, Targeting, 3.

(11.) Thomas X. Hammes, "The Evolution of War: The Fourth Generation," Marine Corps Gazette 78, no. 9 (September 1994): 37.

(12.) Jeffrey White, An Adaptive Insurgency: Confronting Adversary Networks in Iraq, Policy Focus no. 58 (Washington, DC: Washington institute for near east Policy, 2006), 2-3, http://www.Washingtoninstitute.org/templatec04.php?ciD=249 (accessed 20 February 2007).

(13.) Ibid., 6.

(14.) Ibid., 15.

(15.) Martin J. Muckian, "Structural Vulnerabilities of Networked Insurgencies: Adapting to the New Adversary," Parameters 36, no. 4 (Winter 2006-7): 19, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ usawc/Parameters/06winter/muckian.pdf.

(16.) Christopher M. Ford, "Speak No Evil: Targeting a Population's Neutrality to Defeat an Insurgency," Parameters 35, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 53, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/ Parameters/05summer/ford.pdf.

(17.) Anthony H. Cordesman, "Preliminary 'Lessons' of the Israeli-Hezbollah War," working draft (Washington, DC: center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006), 2-23, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060911_isr_hez_lessons.pdf (accessed 20 February 2007).