To bomb or not to bomb? Counterinsurgency, airpower, and dynamic targeting

Air & Space Power Journal, Winter, 2007 by Jason M. Brown

The new FM3-24/Marine corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, treats the decide step as a major part of the targeting process (decide, detect, deliver, and assess) but includes only a very limited discussion of targeting. It erroneously states that "the targeting process occurs in the targeting cell of the appropriate command post." (27) When we target insurgents with airpower, multiple cells collaborating from multiple command posts--including the air and space operations center--conduct the targeting process. FM3-24/ MCWP 3-33.5 simply refers readers to Joint Publication (JP) 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting, for the joint targeting process. However, that publication, updated in April 2007, has only fleeting references to insurgency and does not get to the level of detail one would find in a field manual, which is the level needed for this discussion.

Since doctrine lacks comprehensive guidance for joint targeting in counterinsurgencies, commanders must determine which aspects of current doctrine apply and find other ways to reduce friction and improve decision-making timelines. By improving the capabilities and processes of their staffs, commanders can improve decision-making efficiency considerably. They can have their personnel in intelligence and those with the staff judge advocate develop and work through realistic scenarios that cause dilemmas for decision makers. For example, should our forces strike a house occupied by a high-level insurgent leader and other unknown occupants or attack a funeral attended by large numbers of insurgents? (28) (Both of these scenarios have actually occurred.) commanders should prepare themselves and their staffs for these common dilemmas.

They should also have their targeting personnel continually develop targets appropriate for air strikes and anticipate how they will detect and identify them. Most importantly, commanders should encourage their staffs to build relationships with staffs at higher headquarters and other components in order to facilitate the cross flow of information during dynamic-targeting operations. Ultimately, the artistry of commanders and their understanding of the enemy and themselves will have the greatest effect on the decision process.

If airpower can get to the target in time, it needs to strike with lethal force. Although this shouldn't seem much of a concern, terrorists and insurgents frequently survive air strikes. (29) Since insurgents can occupy various types of structures and move away at any time, weaponeering and flexibility will determine the lethality of the strike.

The weaponeering process determines the number and types of weapons we need to obtain the desired effect when our forces attack a target. (30) Particularly challenging, weaponeering for insurgent targets requires a great deal of artistry. Insurgents survive air strikes for several reasons. First, targeteers often underestimate the strength of the houses occupied by the adversary. Weaponeering programs and methods model military targets and functions but do not account for attacking typical insurgent targets, such as individuals hiding in a safe house or rural compound. Second, targeteers often focus on destroying the facility instead of killing the insurgents inside. Finally, commanders may automatically favor smaller weapons in order to avoid collateral damage. (31) This article does not argue that we should bomb insurgents into oblivion to ensure their death; rather, it illustrates the commander's dilemma of approving enough force to kill the target yet limit collateral damage. Ultimately, the plethora of potential target scenarios and weapons available requires experienced targeting "artists" to confidently produce a solution that will result in the insurgents' (not the facility's) destruction while minimizing collateral damage. Otherwise, commanders must either exercise restraint or risk the political price of an air strike with nothing to show for it.