To bomb or not to bomb? Counterinsurgency, airpower, and dynamic targeting

Air & Space Power Journal, Winter, 2007 by Jason M. Brown

Assessing the Strike

Until recently, any airman asked to define the assessment process would focus on traditional battle damage assessment (BDA), a reductionist process that calls for acquiring imagery of targets attacked by aircraft. Airmen have also attempted to consistently find technological ways to get "real-time BDA" to their commanders. (35) Although latter phases of BDA focus on analyzing effects on the target system, this is a long, often-ignored process centralized at the level of combined Forces command. (36) These approaches to assessment are simply inadequate in a counterinsurgency campaign. assessment should focus on all aspects of friendly action, not just the performance of weapons. It should address the adaptation of the insurgents--not simply their initial reaction, destruction, or survival. (37) Finally, it should place most of its emphasis on the response of the population affected by the air strike.

An air strike against a dynamic target is always a complicated process that needs thorough debriefing and assessment after execution. Knowing how a weapon performed against a target certainly remains important, especially before approaching other aspects of assessment. However, to avoid the traditional BDA paradigm when considering the friendly action, commanders and their staffs should look at all aspects of the OODA process, paying close attention to timelines. Criteria for operational assessment may include logistical, coordination, and C2 aspects. Most importantly, commanders should identify both the amount of time they spent on deciding to strike and any causes of delay.

An air strike will likely cause the insurgent network to react by adapting in some fashion to the loss of a critical element or node. We cannot easily anticipate how or when this adaptation will occur, but our counterinsurgency forces should attempt to observe and understand it. Posturing ISR before, during, and after the strike can assist in this process. Again, analysts should not limit this effort to BDA but watch how the other links and nodes adjust over time. Noting how quickly the adversary replaces these leaders or other critical nodes will provide insight into the adaptability of the insurgency.

A successful air strike can cause insurgents to change their emphasis on certain traits, decentralize their leadership, or expand their operations in order to become more survivable. Writing in 1929 about his experiences fighting "bandits" in nicaragua, Marine corps aviation pioneer Rusty Rowell said, "Occasionally the enemy may establish a large stronghold that would be a suitable target for bombardment. It is certain, however, that he would never make that mistake twice." (38)

Targeting planners must constantly watch for changing links and nodes of an insurgent network and avoid reductionist approaches in their targeting methods. Of course, the insurgents may not adapt at all, especially if a high-tempo counterinsurgency operation does not allow them time to do so. Not all insurgencies have proven as adaptable as the current ones in Iraq and Afghanistan, but counterinsurgency forces should always assume they are until they conduct a thorough assessment.