Maritime homeland defense: a role for land-based airpower?

Air & Space Power Journal, Winter, 2007 by Alexus G. Grynkewich

Editorial Abstract: Given the increasing frequency and resourcefulness with which terrorists have planned and carried out attacks, it is reasonable to believe that maritime operations at US ports and on the high seas are in danger. Lieutenant Colonel Grynkewich contends that airpower can and should assist in countering this threat, and could do so with modest increases in personnel and/or equipment by using currently available manned and unmanned aircraft and space platforms.

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IN JULY 1921, eight of the Army's Martin bombers, participating in a series of joint Army-Navy tests, sank the captured German battleship Ostfriesland. (1) Shortly thereafter, Brig Gen William "Billy" Mitchell, deputy chief of the Army Air Service, declared that "the problem of destruction of seacraft by [air] forces has been solved and is finished." (2) This declaration proved premature, however: attacking ships from the air remains complex. The sequential requirements of finding the target ship, identifying it as a hostile enemy vessel, and neutralizing it still pose significant tactical and technical problems. The challenges become especially salient when one faces an asymmetric threat. nonetheless, examining each of these steps can identify areas in which the inherent flexibility of land-based airpower might enhance US maritime defenses. At the same time, it reveals several command and control (C2) issues that the government must resolve if it decides to use land-based airpower in a maritime-defense role. Prior to addressing these issues, however, this article briefly examines the contemporary maritime-defense environment.

The Contemporary Maritime-Defense Environment

The conflict in which the United States finds itself today differs significantly from earlier wars. In previous conflicts, conventional forces waged a largely symmetric war. In contrast, the 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism correctly noted that today's enemy "is a flexible, transnational network structure, enabled by modern technology and characterized by loose interconnectivity both within and between groups." (3) The attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11) demonstrated the potential power of this new way of war. On that day, "transnational terrorists, organized in widely dispersed, networked nodes, ... swarm[ed] together swiftly, on cue, then pulse[d] to the attack simultaneously." (4)

Although terrorists used aircraft to attack on 9/11, they could easily adapt this highly effective mode to the maritime domain by using commercial vessels to clandestinely deliver weapons of mass destruction, detonating their cargo once in port. Lacking such weapons, terrorists could take control of an ocean freighter and use its cargo or even the ship itself as a weapon. (5) Detonation of a large tanker carrying liquefied natural gas in port could destroy a major US city. (6) Less dramatically, attackers could use any large ship "as a collision weapon for destroying a bridge or refinery located on the waterfront." (7)

Al-Qaeda understands and appreciates the potential modes of attack from the maritime domain. The group reportedly has as many as 23 freighters at its disposal, one of which may have delivered explosives to Saudi Arabia for a car-bomb attack in 1995. (8) Another may have transported bomb-making materials for the attacks on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. (9) Closer to home, Richard Clarke, former White House counterterrorism director, asserted that terrorists affiliated with al-Qaeda "infiltrated Boston by coming in on liquid natural gas tankers from Algeria." (10) Others report that terrorist-affiliated pirates have forcibly boarded vessels and practiced steering "at varying speeds for several hours." (11)

As the United States defends against this new kind of enemy, it must also adapt to a changing operational environment. Prior wars had defined combat zones. In today's conflict with terrorism, however, the combat zone defies attempts at geographic confinement. Accordingly, maritime-defense activities must comply with peacetime international law. The law of the Sea, based on various international norms and treaties, including four 1958 conventions to which the United States is a party, seeks to facilitate and encourage global commerce, and the United States shares this interest. (12) Both the National Security Strategy and National Strategy for Maritime Security recognize that the "safety and economic security of the united States depends upon the secure use of the world's oceans." (13) In this context, traditional US doctrine that calls for the application of overwhelming force does not always work. Simply put, blowing up ships that appear to threaten the homeland is incompatible with facilitating global commerce.

In 2003 approximately 6,000 vessels made roughly 60,000 stops in US ports. (14) The united States must maintain this global commerce yet also protect its 98,000 miles of shoreline; 3.5 million square miles of ocean area; 1,000 harbor channels; and approximately 300 ports.15 In the contemporary operational environment, finding, identifying, and neutralizing the enemy requires a far different skill set from that developed for conventional conflicts. Despite some progress, the United States still faces several critical gaps between its required and resident capacities. Fortunately, the speed, range, and flexibility of land-based airpower have the potential to close or eliminate many of these gaps. (16)