Irregular warfare and the US Air Force: the way ahead

Air & Space Power Journal, Winter, 2007 by Robyn Read

IRREGULAR WARFARE (IW) in general and counterinsurgency (COIN) more specifically require a particular mind-set and specific talents not entirely applicable or common to more traditional styles of warfare. That does not suggest that COIN represents either a new or separate form of war. As Colin Gray stated during the Air Force Symposium on Counterinsurgency held at Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, in April 2007, "War is war," and COIN is part of that equation. further, COIN is not new at all. However, the relative lack of predictability in COIN and its indifferent boundaries regarding what each fight constitutes in terms of objectives and resources are troublesome characteristics well beyond the numbers involved. By definition, insurgency offers a weaker opponent an option against a stronger one. Similarly, it is not, by design, a war wherein the stronger opponent can easily bring his major strengths to bear against the weaker enemy--a condition deserving even more emphasis if the stronger opponent is an outside power such as the United States.

Discussion published in a variety of media sufficiently establishes the history of IW as well as the successes and failures of COIN. (1) Pertinent literature has similarly dissected the distance between the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and today. Therefore, using the 2007 air force Symposium on Counterinsurgency as a primary source, this article looks to the future and attempts to outline an airpower profile for combating terrorism and insurgency in the continuing long war.

Two fundamental observations drove much of the discussion at the conference. First, the USAF has operated with some success in COIN environments before but has lost the peculiar capacities associated with COIN following drawdowns or conversions after each conflict. This is an unsurprising result, given the fact that budgets for unused tools are a luxury not easily afforded in any era. But the extended lead times required to essentially relearn COIN each time it becomes necessary have significantly affected the USAF's ability to effectively contribute early in the fight. Second, we need to change the USAF's mind-set from fighting COIN to enabling a partner to fight COIN. In the absence of every other alternative, the USAF may actually become the fighter in COIN, but even at that point, the service should adopt the mind-set that it will conduct a holding action while the supported partner spins up its own capacity. As a practical note, the USAF simply does not have the size to function as the air service for every nation it fights alongside, even if it sounds like a good idea (it is not). Winning strategies are conducted by, with, and through the supported partner. Furthermore, barring annihilation options, no substantial history exists to support the idea that any outside power can win an inside war. The Quadrennial Defense Review Report of 2006 provides an important framework for this discussion:

   Long-duration, complex operations involving
   the U.S. military, other government agencies and
   international partners will be waged simultaneously
   in multiple countries around the world,
   relying on a combination of direct (visible) and
   indirect (clandestine) approaches.... Maintaining
   a long-term, low-visibility presence in many
   areas of the world where U.S. forces do not traditionally
   operate will be required. Building and
   leveraging partner capacity will also be an absolutely
   essential part of this approach, and the
   employment of surrogates will be a necessary
   method for achieving many goals. (2)

The use of indigenous forces in COIN does more than build stakeholders in the outcome. as noted, local knowledge translates into very practical intelligence in ways that a satellite image does not convey. Additionally, in terms of understanding the mechanisms for victory, COIN emphasizes the human dynamic to a far greater extent than do traditional conflicts. Differences between COIN and other styles of warfare (e.g., attrition-based depletion of enemy resources in large-scale, state-on-state conflict) accrue largely from differences in the center of gravity and the means necessary to move or control it. Historically, in state-on-state warfare, a fielded army could serve as both a principal threat and the principal shield that allowed the enemy state its freedom of action. Taking away the shield simultaneously removes the threat and exposes the enemy state. However, in COIN, enemy leadership derives its freedom of action not from its "fielded army" per se but from a permissive environment often enabled by the ruling establishment's lack of credibility, legitimacy, and support from its own "governed" population. ultimately, in COIN, one must win over the population, thereby eliminating the sanctuary and the enemy's freedom to choose where and when to fight.

The 2007 Air Force Symposium on Counterinsurgency

Held at the Air War College and sponsored by Headquarters Air Force, Air Combat Command (ACC), and Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), this venue provided a forum for discussing the use of airpower in COIN; it included 11 workshops, eight speakers in plenary sessions, and over 170 participants. (3) Joint, interagency, international, and civilian participants added substantial value with their insights and perspectives. However, the conference focused not on interaction or interdependence at these higher levels but on what the USAF needed to do to improve its understanding of the fight and its contributions to winning that fight. Seeking to answer these questions, the 11 workshops generated over 220 suggestions.