Irregular warfare and the US Air Force: the way ahead

Air & Space Power Journal, Winter, 2007 by Robyn Read

But "doing" and "teaching" have different objectives and require different talent sets, each engendering different, at times incompatible, mind-sets and tactics (not to mention inventories of people and equipment). In constructing these mission sets, however, the USAF should keep in mind that legitimacy for the partner government serves as the overarching filter or backdrop for great-power mentoring. Legitimacy is the precursor for victory. Any action perceived as undermining the credibility of the host government can feed the perception of its incompetence and thus encourage hostile groups to make demands on or attack the central government. (8) As a general principle, we should set as a goal working by, with, or through a partner nation rather than for that nation--or on behalf of or in lieu of that nation. We should conduct good works--even those uncontested by hostile groups--in the framework of an effective communications plan in order to maximize the potential for establishing, sustaining, or enhancing the authenticity of the central government.

If the USAF wishes to become effective in this "standing-in-the-back-row" style of engagement, it should acknowledge the necessity of fulfilling two (sometimes competing) mission sets. One, and in the absence of alternatives, the service should have full capability to directly engage the enemy--to fight COIN or COIN-like engagements as a key component of the national effort. This will inevitably occur in a joint, interagency, and coalition-based context. Two, the USAF should have the capacity to create within the partner nation the requisite skill sets and disciplines in air, space, and cyberspace which enable that partner to realize its national goals without the large footprints or heavy hand of America's airpower.

This principle--to seek common objectives and enable partners--devolves not only from the separate discussions above concerning internal wars and the legitimacy of central government, but also from the very practical realization that the USAF is not (and will not become) large enough to fight as the principal air service for every nation affected by the long war. USAF policy should emphasize early engagement (i.e., during phase zero--shaping) for the purpose of building sufficient partner capacity to mitigate or even eliminate the need for a USAF presence in large numbers later on. The goal is to teach, guide, and advise a host air service without (and without the perception of) usurping the host government's prerogatives. (9)

End-state planning (the aggregate of effects at a strategic level) requires the development of connected efforts to produce a desired political outcome. Further, it envisions the enemy as an interactive and adaptive system that includes both friendly and hostile elements. (10) By focusing on the problem sets in these ways, effects-based approaches provide the necessary framework to ensure that military operations stay attuned to the nation's strategic goals rather than drift to tactical, close-in targets. Tactical efficiencies should not establish the governing metrics for overall strategy. (11) Similarly, in COIN or COIN-like conflicts, techniques peculiar to an effects-based approach to operations should ensure that military solutions will not become the focus of a fundamentally political problem. (12) To do otherwise would concentrate efforts on a relatively small part of the problem, address no causal factors, and, ultimately, resolve nothing. Operational design in support of a set of defined end-state conditions yields an additional pressure for effectiveness over efficiency and minimizes emphasis on peripheral operations not tied to the effects necessary for the strategic end state. Recent coalition experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan exemplify the futility of military operations adrift from the complementary political, communication, economic, and sociocultural initiatives needed to seal the victory.