Irregular warfare and the US Air Force: the way ahead

Air & Space Power Journal, Winter, 2007 by Robyn Read

The US Navy Strategic Studies group published a report in 2006 that spoke of a 1,000-ship Navy--a radically different proposition, however, from the 600-ship Navy of the 1980s advocated by John Lehman, secretary of the Navy at the time. The new concept looks at both the type of vessel required in the long war (perhaps more river/brown-water emphasis and less blue-water emphasis) and who might provide and/or operate that vessel. A shift or rebalancing in inventory types for the US Navy might occur but certainly not a fivefold increase in hulls--something impossible to achieve and sustain in the current fiscal environment and probably not the most effective solution in IW/COIN. Instead, under this concept, the Navy would increase specific capabilities by looking for partner nations in a comprehensive strategy for engagement. Airmen should ask themselves whether an appropriate USAF version of a 1,000-ship Navy exists.

USAF Airmen are already engaged in BPC in many locations--obviously Iraq and Afghanistan but also in exchange and education programs as well as USAF sections within various embassies and military groups. In too many examples, though, the selection process and preparation for overseas assignments amount to little more than an availability check. The USAF has smart, proficient, and motivated people who have shown remarkable agility in their ability to adapt and learn. (17) Unfortunately, too much of this learning has occurred on the job. Institutionally, the USAF has an opportunity to shape the battlespace. Rather than approaching BPC as a bill to pay, the USAF should adapt its structure to meet a long-term commitment to educate and train foreign air forces. Alternatives to such a strategy are not encouraging.

The protracted, complex nature of insurgency challenges war-fighting institutions who find themselves culturally affixed to high-speed find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess cycles. (18) This pseudoengineering/scientific approach to cause and effect falsely establishes near-term time constraints for success, and these expectations are exacerbated by an omnipresent, high-speed media that needs to report results on a near-continuous basis. These environmental conditions produce a frequently truncated assessment cycle, a lack of patience for cascading or long-term effects, and a spotlight on near-term tactical reporting, in stark contrast to the glacial progress in most historical accounts regarding insurgency. (19) for example, some pundits note the British Malay experience as something of a "gold standard" in how one should conduct COIN. But LTC John Nagl of the US Army points out that if that is true, then the "pool and Olympic record" is about 12 years. (20) Northern Ireland took somewhat longer. (21) As an institution, the USAF has not historically demonstrated a strong willingness to see combat issues in 12-year cycles.

Acknowledging the distinctions between conventional warfare and COIN becomes especially important for Airmen as they assess how to contribute in COIN interventions. In these circumstances, the key--the first--strategic decision calls for determining whether to fight COIN or to enable COIN. More bluntly, the choice becomes whether to force an existing conventional military template onto a set of largely incompatible circumstances or to build up a partner nation's capacity to win on its own merit. In strong consensus, speakers and symposium participants warned that no history supports the idea that outside powers win internal wars. Thus, we should choose to enable. as counterintuitive as it may seem at first, this reconceptualization of how to frame airpower's contribution is fundamental to actually winning in the long view.