The opportunities and challenges of change

CHIPS, Summer, 2004 by Michael Wynne

Wynne was sworn in as the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) on July 17, 2001. He also served as the Principal Deputy to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics. In 1999, Mr. Wynne retired as Senior Vice President from General Dynamics, where his role was in International Development and Strategy. He spent 23 years with General Dynamics in various senior positions with aircraft (F-16), main battle tanks (M1A2), and space launch vehicles (Atlas and Centaur). He also spent three years with Lockheed Martin, having sold the Space Systems Division to [then] Martin Marietta. He integrated the division into the Astronautics Company and became the general manager of the Space Launch Systems segment, combining the Titan with the Atlas Launch vehicles. Prior to joining industry, Wynne served in the Air Force for seven years, leaving active duty as a captain and assistant professor of astronautics at the U.S. Air Force Academy teaching control theory and fire control techniques. Wynne graduated from the U.S. Military Academy and holds a master's degree in electrical engineering from the Air Force Institute of Technology and a master's degree in business from the University of Colorado.

Acting Under Secretary Wynne's article has been edited from his remarks at AFCEA TechNet International 2004, May 13.

One hundred years ago, the U.S. Army was engaged in a controversial, protracted, irregular war, in a distant land, against insurgent opponents in the Mindanao phase of the Philippine Insurrection. Our military forces were small, composed of volunteers and service professionals. Because of inadequate planning and the stress on forces supporting global expeditionary operations, the military departments began to transform to fight in what we now call Industrial Age warfare.

We got that transformation right--eventually. June 2004 marks 60 years since the landings in Normandy; arguably the largest joint military operation ever attempted--and we did it while simultaneously executing sizable joint amphibious attacks in the Mariana Islands. We proved supremely adept at fighting Industrial Age warfare. Through its practice we defeated two powerful rivals, secured the safety and prosperity of our own country and those of our allies, and had the means to face down another superpower for over 40 years.

Because the long view in Washington seldom extends past the beginning of an administration, it is tempting to view our current transformation through the lens of the last two years--that is, through our campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, each fought with unprecedented, unorthodox methods that highlight not only the superb courage, flexibility and skill of our forces, but the extraordinary technology that we employ in taking the fight to our enemies. Transformation is not unique to our time, it isn't something that happens overnight, and it doesn't happen all by itself. We have to decide, we have to act, and we have to manage our choices.

Current DoD Transformation Efforts

The goal of our current transformation is to enable us to fight war on our terms, which our Director of Transformation, retired Navy Adm. Art Cebrowski, says will mean trading industrial mass for information technology. This is not a matter of simply changing one form of war for another; it's about developing the determination and the capability to change; not once or twice--but as the situation demands. As Art says, "If you are not making any big bets; you are a fixed strategic target and at risk."

One big bet we are making is on network-centric operations. We see this as a path to ensure sustained competitive advantage, and to create new competitive areas--both imperatives if you are serious about creating and sustaining change. On the acquisition side, this means decreasing cycle times and managing the devolution of "sunset" capabilities and processes. It means we are serious about spiral development and about reinvigorating the lost art of system of systems engineering.

Network-centric operations require us to field new kinds of forces. We understand now that the speed of modern warfare creates a continuum, not a succession of phases. Our forces will have to be more expeditionary (lighter, more lethal); capable of precision engagement; able to leverage persistent ISR [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance]; with tighter sensor-shooter times, and with expanded unmanned capabilities: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV); Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV); Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (UUV); and robotics.

It's obvious that none of these changes will happen overnight; it's less obvious that we have been struggling with these changes for a generation. At least as far back as the comparatively small, short-legged expedition to Grenada in 1983, we've known where the deficiencies in command and control, battle management and joint operations are. We have exhaustively studied them, then responded with robust management, mind-boggling acronyms, elaborate codification of technical language, long-term commitments to programs and, of course, money. Our command and control bill for the Department continues to grow and is currently at the level of tens of billions of dollars in the POM (Program Objective Memorandum).