Brigade Task Force communicates in OEF: in the Afghanistan environment, with many mountains and low grounds coupled with the harsh weather and environment, the segment was key to the fighter's success

Army Communicator, Spring, 2004 by Michael P. Martel

Fighting and communicating in the deserts of Afghanistan proved to be tough and tricky for the 1st Brigade Task Force of the 82nd Airborne Division. The mountainous terrain and sandy environment made line-of-sight communications impossible and equipment maintenance essential. This is how one light infantry brigade solved the communication problems of Operation Enduring Freedom and some of the lessons learned along the way.

First the basics: single-channel communications

Tactical satellite ruled the battlefield with single-channel communications. It was the primary means of communications for all firebases for both voice and data. Although we tried several methods for sending data, the ViaSat Data Controller-400 cards became the method that worked best. We tried High-Performance Wave guide software, but not enough Harris117F radios were present to make it the primary method. Another reason HPW was not used was because of after action reports from the previous 82nd units. They had reported that the 117Fs while using HPW would often overheat. In some cases the radios would damage some of their own internal parts. The radios were too valuable to risk losing. We did experience some problems using the VDC-400 cards (such as getting settings correct, cables breaking, occasional data errors, etc.) but the method worked most of the time. PSC-5s and 117Fs were the primary radios used. Both radios can push 20 watts and are menu driven. The infantry relied heavily on these radios, to where they started asking for more radios than available. The Multi-Band Inter/Intra Team Radio was the only solution. With only five watts, this radio provided a solution that was not as powerful as the bigger radios, but with its smaller size and versatility, it was the infantry favorite. The MBITTR in the TACSAT mode soon became known as the MSAT. The MST-20 was also used when available, but its age made it prone to maintenance problems. These radios also lacked the ability to pass data.

Key to the success of the single-channel TACSAT communications was the channel or segment. In the Afghanistan environment, with many mountains and low grounds coupled with the harsh weather and environment, the segment was key to the fighter's success. It was important to have a wideband segment that units in contact could talk on excitedly without having to slow down the messages to make them understood. It was important to have a dedicated channel, not a Demand Access Multiple Assigned channel, that units could talk on immediately without waiting for a time slot. It was important being on a satellite with an elevation great enough that units did not have to be on the highest point or exactly on the correct azimuth and elevation to get on the bird. Most units mounted antennas pointing straight up on vehicles and were able to communicate while on the move.

Each infantry battalion had five single-channel TACSAT radios made up of two 117Fs and three PSC-5s. The brigade had an additional three radios for use in the tactical-operations center, tactical-assault center and one to use where needed. Aviation units also had single-channel TACSAT radios to talk to aircraft and ground stations throughout the country. We did not have enough radios to monitor more than one network with all the firebases on the command net.

The command net was primary with the data net used occasionally. The MBITTR became worth its weight in gold and would have been more useful if a dismounted amplifier solution was available for a dismounted role.

Very-high-frequency, frequency modulation radios were also used in the single-channel secure mode. This was for one primary reason--special forces and other branches did not frequency hop. The brigade itself was very proficient at frequency hopping, but the other joint units were used to using single channel. Although communications security was changed weekly for these nets, the reported threat of enemy forces breaking our encryption or intercepting our transmissions was very small, so the decision was made to not use frequency hopping. Each firebase or airfield had its own net. Since all organizations needed to be on that net or be able to get on that net quickly, single channel was used. This also made it easier for inbound aircraft to talk to the ground units. The use of single channel made it significantly easier to program a station in the command and control aircraft that was not planned for. The C2 aircraft was widely used to control many air assaults as well as operations and ground assault convoys.

High frequency was not used effectively in this operation. This was not because radios were not available. It all goes back to the same old problem with HF--having a good training program. The new Harris PRC-150 radios worked great. These radios with Automatic Link Establishment capability cut out the need for a lot of frequency propagation, testing frequencies and working with antennas. Some areas even had their radios working great and communicating clearly over great distances. Other stations couldn't talk to anybody. The biggest problems we say were antennas and getting the settings correct on the radios. Most Soldiers do not know enough to select or set up the correct antenna. The AS2259, near vertical incident sky wave, worked sometimes, but a doublet antenna 10 feet off the ground nearly always worked. With its many levels of menus and setting, the PRC-150 presented problems to those who were untrained and those who liked to make adjustments.