Ask the cyber-insurgent: are information operations a decisive form of operational warfare?

Army Communicator, Wntr, 2008 by Jan C. Norris

"Attention in the operations center, attention in the operations center, as of 0730 this morning, our steady theater Information Operation campaign has allowed multi-national forces to achieve information superiority, Victory is imminent." These words have assuredly never been uttered in any United States led military operations center nor are they likely to be heard anytime soon in Iraq or elsewhere ... at least not with a straight face.

United States Joint and Army Information Operations doctrine maintains that achieving information superiority is a critical factor for success in military operations. Yet for the past four years, U.S. forces have been unable to achieve true IS in connection with Operation Iraqi Freedom.

While possessing an overwhelming edge in information technology to dominate IS, U.S. forces have faltered in one critical area: denying the enemy the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information.

Through four years of OIF, the cyber-enabled insurgent has evolved and operated relatively uninhibited using the Internet and media as a means for controlling and sustaining momentum and achieving both tactical success from within by recruiting and mobilizing personnel, and strategic success by influencing international perceptions.

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]

If IO are to ever gain status as a decisive form of operational warfare for U.S. forces, a Joint Cyberspace Surveillance Targeting Cell must be established to increase focus and scope of cyber-surveillance and targeting for forces engaged in OIF. This would enable forces to deny cyber-insurgent cyberspace Internet and media access and mobility and while edging closer to achievment of a level of IS that directly impacts operational success.

U.S. Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations, states that the "principal goal (of IO doctrine) is to achieve and maintain information superiority" and "IO are used to deny adversaries access to their C2 (command and control) information and other supported automated infrastructures." (1)

Given these tenets of IO doctrine and the ability of U.S. forces to successfully dominate in a majority of the contributors to IS, there should logically be some degree of IS influence on military operational success. But does achieving IS really matter if there is not an effective way to deny or mitigate the enemy's medium for information exchange? Is achieving IS a real concern for today's commanders at the operational level of war?

In Iraq, several distinguished leaders during the past four years developed innovative techniques and procedures for success in defeating local insurgents on the ground and engaging the Iraqi populace using IO.

COLs H.R. McMaster, Dave Putnam, and GEN Dave Petraeus are recognized for their exceptional ability to conduct successful tactical ground campaigns against the threat while also, and perhaps more critically, engaging the Iraqi leadership and population through sound IO efforts. Despite successful IO and recent positive trends with the "surge strategy", there appears to be little attention focused on achieving IS and a long period of time is still needed to achieve the desired end state of Iraqi autonomy where the insurgency is neutralized and host nation population confident of a stable, legitimate Iraqi government.

The OIF scenario leads back to similar questions; what difference does having IS and conducting IO matter for U.S. forces in Iraq? On the ground, it certainly helps to build trust and confidence among Iraqi local communities and U.S. military and Iraqi forces, while having the ability to collect intelligence via advanced systems and technology helps to detect patterns of activity to track and target the enemy.

But are IS and IO helping to mitigate the cyberspace activity sustaining and feeding the insurgency?

From a macro view of the information environment, do U.S. forces truly have IS?

In most cases the answer is no. Little is being done to decisively engage the enemy in cyberspace. 'An insurgent can possess information superiority and an information advantage because he can stay hidden, yet see U.S. forces and decide when to attack. IO efforts and achieving IS can be fleeting; its forces must recognize this and take action to reduce the enemy's IS and operational efficiency. IS in the new operational environment must include denying information helpful to the enemy.' (2)

"A recent posting to a Jihadi web site announced a competition to design a new Web Page for an Iraqi militant group. The incentive was the chance to fire missiles by remote control at a U.S. military base" (3)

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]

Since 9/11, the growth of jihadi related web sites has grown significantly to more than 4,500. (4) Many of these sites strongly advocate the ideology of Al-Qaeda and have evolved into virtual bases for recruiting, training, coordinating attacks, sharing information, fund raising (even using PayPal) and influencing through propaganda. (5) The Internet allows for the 'cyber-mobilization' of a variety of ethnic populations around the globe with similar cultural and ideological causes. (6)