Fight like you train

Mech, Summer, 2004 by Allen Stephens

During our fleet visits to do safety surveys, risk-management presentations, and cultural workshops, we often encounter commands that have completed successful tours in support of real-world operational tasking. OIF is certainly one example, and the ongoing war on terrorism in Afghanistan (OEF), as well as other parts of the globe, is another. Chances are good that we will get involved in more events like these in the years to come, and our maintainers need to be prepared.

Not long ago, it wasn't uncommon to spend 20 to 30 years maintaining aircraft without being involved in armed conflict. This new and challenging environment has revitalized our collective sense of mission and purpose, and it tests the limits of our ability and professionalism on a daily basis. However, we should be reminded of one great fallacy in aviation maintenance: the notion that an exceptional world event merits exceptional practices, policies and deviations.

The business end of the sorties flown during OEF and in other parts of the world may change, but the maintainer's effort, in reality, is no different. We have strived for years to provide the best quality aircraft that time, money and expertise can attain. We have worked to satisfy flight schedules of all types and lengths, trying to prepare for the real-world tasking we are engaged in today.

My statement may seem obvious, but imagine the surprise when my teams come across activities that intentionally and willfully neglect necessary and required practices and policies. These squadrons try to rationalize their actions with the belief, "Now it's for real, so we don't have to do the paperwork." I'm even more surprised when seasoned maintenance managers not only buy into that premise but occasionally initiate it.

I know certain things change during the "heat of battle," such as the need for more crew rest, reduced ground responsibilities for pilots and NFOs, and fewer reports or paperwork not related directly to the operational mission. Some of these exceptions make sense.

Unfortunately, the idea of suspending responsibilities in program areas has crept into critical parts of the maintenance program in a number of commands. These programs are essential to operating aircraft effectively and safely; yet, they intentionally are being neglected and ignored in the name of perceived mission urgency.

This mindset serves three purposes, and none of them are good. It places aircrew and aircraft in jeopardy because we short circuit the very processes and programs intended to keep them safe and operationally ready. It sends a negative message to our youngest maintainers (e.g., that these issues are not as vital as leadership has made them seem). This comes after we have told them these steps are necessary for the safe and effective operation of the highly technical and advanced platforms that they support. My last point is that it results in an overwhelming backlog of program requirements, which may take months to correct. This "fix" is done after the fact, and it fosters errors, a lack of attention to the necessary details, and potentially leaves devastating gaps in critical tracking information.

Maintainers should understand these programs are in place to help with the "fixing" part of aircraft maintenance, and these paper trails and management issues are just as vital as "the fix" itself.

The phrase "Fight like you train" borders on cliche and may seem contrite to some, but it definitely applies to the business of naval-aviation maintenance. It reminds us that deviations from policy should be considered, approved and used only when absolutely necessary. These exceptions should follow the ORM model and be decided only at the appropriate level. A squadron isn't that level.

Providing the best quality aircraft possible is what maintainers do best, and we should do it following the rules, during times of war or peace. What the operators do with that quality product is up to them, and it often is transparent to us. That fact is OK, but we can't let loose rules overtake our commands. Maintenance leaders must be the last line of defense.

Cdr. Stephens is the maintenance officer at the Naval Safety Center.