Remarks to the Heritage Foundation

US Department of Defense Speeches, May 13, 2008

As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Colorado Springs, Colorado. Tuesday. May 13, 2008

Thank you.

It is always good to be away from Washington, D.C.--and of course the beauty of the Broadmoor and Colorado Springs make it especially difficult to go back to the place where many folks often become lost in thought because it's such unfamiliar territory.

I appreciate the opportunity this morning to share some observations about the state of America's military.

For starters, I should note that, despite my job description, I may not actually be the best person to speak at a conference titled, "The Military Beyond Iraq." I say this because for much of the past year I've been trying to concentrate the minds and energies of the defense establishment on the current needs and current conflicts. In short, to ensure that all parts of the Defense Department are, in fact, at war.

This was driven home to me just a couple of weeks ago during a visit to Fort Bliss, Texas. That post is undergoing an extraordinary change, with massive amounts of new construction, to include gleaming, new barracks to house the soldiers who will be coming from other posts and countries. In the days before we touched down in El Paso, news broke of scenes of squalor in a barracks at Fort Bragg for paratroopers just returning from Afghanistan. These were experienced, battle-tested soldiers who may be considering whether they want to make a career of the Army--troops we can ill afford to lose.

Then there was the case of the outpatient facilities at Walter Reed. One of the reasons upgrading these quarters had not been a high priority is because the hospital was scheduled to be closed in a few years due to BRAC. So there was a bureaucratic and financial disincentive to spend new money--something that could make budget sense during peacetime, but not when troops are being seriously wounded in combat nearly every day. Young men and women who step forward and join this country's armed services must have confidence that they and their families will be taken care of if something happens on the battlefield. As I've said before, after the wars themselves, we have no higher priority.

A similar dynamic may have been at work in the case of MRAPs, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected--where we are talking about spending more than $20 billion for a vehicle that many people see as not having much use beyond Iraq. In fact, the expense of the vehicles--which are nearly a $1 million apiece--may have been seen as competing with the funding for future weapons programs with strong constituencies inside and outside the Pentagon.

There is a strong case to be made that IEDs and suicide bombings have become the weapon of choice for America's most dangerous and likely adversaries--and the need to have a vehicle of this kind won't go away. Even if that weren't the case, if sending thousands of MRAPs halfway across the world can save the lives and limbs of young Americans, and can demonstrate to those troops, their families, and to the country that everything is being done to protect our servicemen on the front lines--then I think this money is more than well spent.

And in fact, MRAPs have performed. There have been 150-plus attacks so far on MRAPs and all but six soldiers have survived. The casualty rate is one-third that of a Humvee, less than half that of an Abrams tank. These vehicles are saving lives.

In my view, America's key asymmetric advantage is our people. And getting the present right when it comes to care of our men and women in uniform will go a long way towards making sure we have the kind of force we need in the future.

I use these examples as an introduction to a wider point. There is a good deal of debate and discussion--within the military, the Congress, and elsewhere--about whether we are putting too much emphasis on current demands--in particular, Iraq. And whether this emphasis is creating too much risk in other areas, such as:

* Preparing for potential future conflicts;

* Being able to handle a contingency elsewhere in the world; and

* Over stressing the ground forces, in particular the Army.

Much of what we are talking about is a matter of balancing risk: today's demands versus tomorrow's contingencies; irregular and asymmetric threats versus conventional threats. As the world's remaining superpower, we have to be able to dissuade, deter, and, if necessary, respond to challenges across the spectrum.

Nonetheless, I have noticed too much of a tendency towards what might be called "Next-War-itis"--the propensity of much of the defense establishment to be in favor of what might be needed in a future conflict. This inclination is understandable, given the dominant role the Cold War had in shaping America's peacetime military, where the United States constantly strove to either keep up with or get ahead of another superpower adversary.

And, certainly, one cannot predict the future with any certainty. Soon after 1900, Winston Churchill said that he could not foresee any "collision of interests" with Germany. In the 1920s, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer, he said that there wasn't the "slightest chance" of war with Japan in his lifetime. Today, rising and resurgent powers with new wealth and ambition are pursuing military modernization programs. They must be watched closely and hedged against.