Brookings Institution dinner

US Department of Defense Speeches, May 5, 2008

There is strong support in the ranks of the military for building up this civilian capacity. In fact, it was at a Brookings event last year that Admiral Mike Mullen, as Chief of Naval Operations, told Carlos Pascual [Pass Kwall] that he'd be willing to give part of the Navy's budget to the State Department--a small part, mind you--provided it was spent properly.

What is encouraging is that a consensus appears to be forming at long last among people of varying ideologies and of both political parties that we need to strengthen America's nonmilitary instruments of national power. There is also a sense that we should take a hard look at the underlying bureaucratic structure of the U.S. national security apparatus inherited from the Cold War era.

Three weeks ago, I testified with Secretary Rice before the House Armed Services Committee. The subject of the hearing was interagency cooperation between State and Defense, with a particular focus on helping other countries build capable security forces. I was advised before the hearing to expect, at most, a couple of questions on these subjects, before the questions all turned to Iraq, or base closures, or the fate of a particular weapons system.

But in fact, for the better part of three hours, the questions and discussion focused on the topic of how our U.S. government civilians and military perform and cooperate together. Members of the committee, both Republicans and Democrats, were interested, they believed change was needed, and they wanted to know what they could do to help.

One of the items we discussed was whether ad hoc incremental change current structure is best, or whether we should proceed with a legislative overhaul along the lines of a new National Security Act of 1947, but one for the 21st century. At the request of the Congress, the Department of Defense is funding a study to address that very issue, and organizations such as Brookings with your 21st Century Defense Initiative represent an excellent source of independent expertise. I believe the question of how to reform our interagency structures for national security ought to be high on the agenda of the next president.

At this point I should note that one of the reasons I am rarely invited to lecture in political-science departments, including at Texas A&M, is that I usually tell the students that most of what they've learned in textbooks about how government works (or doesn't) doesn't really get at the essence. What matters most, I believe, based on 42 years of experience and observation, are people and their relationships.

Not even the most enlightened or well-crafted interagency structure will work, for example, if the Secretaries of State and Defense can't stand each other and won't work together, as too often has been the case during the seven presidencies in which I have served. The fact that our respective bureaucracies know that Condi Rice and I get along goes a long way towards making sure that serious attempts are made to reconcile differences and coordinate policy--at least most of the time.