The Aviation Support Battalion—workhorse of Army aviation: the authors chronicle the 603d Aviation Support Battalion's move across Iraq in support of the 3d Infantry Division's Aviation Brigade

Army Logistician, July-August, 2004 by Timothy J. Whalen, Richard T. Knapp

If you were asked to develop an organization that could support a heavy division's aviation brigade using published doctrine on combat operations, you might come up with something that resembles the current aviation support battalion. But suppose you were asked to develop an organization to support an aviation brigade as it operated across a distributed battlefield and conducted split-based operations with multiple forward area rearming and refueling points. This organization also would have to move the aviation brigade's ground assets (and its own) 300 miles across difficult terrain with little or no throughput of supplies. With these additional parameters, your design probably would change significantly.

This was the dilemma that confronted the 603d Aviation Support Battalion (ASB) when it was assigned to the Division Support Command (DISCOM) of the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia, for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Our logistics dilemma boiled down to this: How do you employ transformational tactics to support a division's aviation brigade when you have legacy equipment, organizations, and capabilities? Part of the solution resided in the division commander's guidance to "go light." The rest of the solution evolved through trying nondoctrinal solutions, embedding aviation intermediate maintenance (AVIM) and direct support capabilities in supported units, identifying key tasks that would ensure the aviation brigade's success, and making sure that leaders at every level knew not only what the key tasks were but also what being a key task meant.

The key tasks that were identified in the battalion commander's intent during the military decision-making process were--

* Get the 4th Brigade--the 3d Infantry Division's Aviation Brigade, located at Camp Udairi, Kuwait--to the fight. To do this, we would dedicate internal cargo assets for external support.

* Provide an uninterrupted flow of bulk class III (petroleum, oils, and lubricants). It was imperative that the 4th Brigade would never have to look for fuel. We had to have it where and when they needed it.

* Move ourselves using a tactical road march of battalion elements. This operation would be our highest risk. Leaders would have to conduct close supervision during all phases of the move.

The major constraint in the theater up to and beyond crossing the line of departure was ground transportation assets. When we compared that constraint to the key tasks (all of which demanded transportation assets), it was intuitively obvious that we had to be creative in addressing the applicable tactical logistics functions of fuel, move, fix, arm, and sustain.

Fuel

The ability of the 603d ASB to provide adequate resupply of bulk class III to the 4th Brigade was tested early in the fight. The DISCOM's planning process called for division- and corps-level fuel assets to be task-organized to the three brigade combat teams, including five to the 4th Brigade for movement into Iraq. Although those fuel assets eventually were returned to division and corps control, bulk class III was provided by supply point distribution for the majority of operations through the seizure of Baghdad International Airport.

In support of the 4th Brigade's mission to destroy Iraqi observation posts and intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance units, the 603d ASB had fuel assets at Camp Udairi, from which the war was initiated, and at Objective Raiders, which was the 4th Brigade's attack position. From Raiders, the battalion's remaining tankers were further task-organized between the brigade's main body, which was prepared to move forward over 200 miles to Objective Rams in central Iraq, and "Force Module 1," which was poised to move to Jalibah Southeast Air Base, an intermediate staging base for support of the Tallil fight.

Our fuel estimates for the fight included fuel for the 1st Battalion, 3d Aviation Regiment's three six-ship AH-64D Apache Longbow helicopter companies and the UH-60A Black Hawk helicopters used by six forward support medical evacuation teams in support of the forward brigade combat teams (BCTs).

Although the Tallil fight was planned as a 24-hour operation, it actually took over 96 hours. Marine Corps helicopters, which were collocated with Force Module 1 at Jalibah, also generated unscheduled bulk fuel requirements for the ASB. Providing adequate fuel was a critical task that was accomplished only through the willingness of soldiers and noncommissioned officers to work and drive in spite of exhaustion.

With the eventual destruction of the Iraqi 11th Infantry Division at Tallil, the 5,000-gallon corps fuel tankers that had been task-organized to the brigade combat teams returned to corps control "bone dry." The overage allowed in our estimates had been completely consumed. Our bulk petroleum requirements (22,500 gallons) from the line of departure (Camp Udairi) to Tallil were still significantly less than those of an armored or mechanized BCT. Because of our unique fuel transport capability, we were able to remain flexible on this fluid battlefield. This was the first example in the war of the critical need for this specialized fuel transportation. From reception, staging, onward movement, and integration through the end of 2003, the 603d ASB's petroleum and ammunition platoon dispensed over a million gallons of JP8 fuel, both retail and wholesale, to the 4th Brigade, corps aviation units, and joint, coalition, and other governmental agencies.