Eliminating the iron mountain: just-in-time supply distribution has only reduced, and not eliminated, the hoarding of excess repair parts and supplies. The author believes that the Army must overhaul its entire supply system if efficiency in obtaining parts and supplies is to be achieved and hoarding is to stop

Army Logistician, July-August, 2004 by Laurel K. Myers

The Army's traditional mass-based logistics system involves stocking a large inventory of parts and supplies that may be required to satisfy mission requirements. The intent of maintaining a large inventory is to shorten the length of time required to obtain parts and supplies when they are needed. These "iron mountains" of stocks are regarded as dependable, readily available sources of supplies required for forces to be rapidly deployable, highly mobile, and sustainable. Maintaining iron mountains of supplies places heavy demands on Army resources that are increasingly scarce, including warehouse space, personnel to operate warehouses and move supplies, and space on transporters. However, budget reductions have continued to decrease the funds allocated to resource these functions over the years.

Following the end of the Cold War, most Americans felt that overseas threats to U.S. interests had been reduced greatly. Thus, during the 1990s, politically motivated changes produced an austere fiscal environment that limited the Army's ability to carry out the policies and commitments mandated by the National Military Strategy. When the military operational structure was reduced even as military commitments around the globe increased, Army supply logistics became inadequate. Budget constraints restricted routine vehicle repairs, delayed deliveries of parts and supplies, and impeded the implementation of vehicle maintenance initiatives and modernization programs.

After Operation Desert Storm, the Army began a shift from just-in-ease stockage to a more cost-effective. velocity-based logistics system that closely parallels the distribution system used in the commercial sector. With this system, known as just-in-time distribution, buyers communicate with suppliers electronically to order needed supplies that are shipped directly to the user without the need for warehouse storage. Just-in-time distribution replenishes needed items as consumption occurs and substantially reduces the inventory. An electronic supplier-buyer interface also eliminates several steps in the ordering process, thereby speeding delivery of supplies.

Just-in-Case Stockage

For users of just-in-case stockage, the quest for a part usually begins with an attempt to get the item from another in-theater unit that may be stocking it against some future need, may already have traded the part with another unit, or may have misplaced it, which results in a search. Thus, units depending on just-in-case stockage may experience extended wait times until they receive needed parts.

An important advantage of just-in-case stockage is that the unit in need may have stocked the part "just in case" it is needed so that it is immediately available to the requester and no wait time is encountered. However, interviews with personnel deployed for Operation Desert Storm indicated that, in using the just-in-case system, they often could not locate requested parts that were supposed to be in the theater.

Just-in-Time Distribution

The users of a just-in-time distribution system also face wait times that vary according to whether or not the manufacturer of the needed part has it on hand, can produce it specifically to fill the order, or has discontinued manufacture of the part. In just-in-time distribution, a needed part is ordered through channels from the manufacturer or depot and shipped directly to the requesting unit. A significant disadvantage of pure just-in-time distribution is that the requester has no option to obtain a part from just-in-case stockage in the theater.

The findings of an independent 1995 study of supply logistics in Operation Desert Storm indicated that, because military customers had to use chains of command and distribution in the ordering and delivery processes, the speed of Army distribution of supplies was slower than that of civilian distribution. At that time, Department of Defense distribution systems took 26 days to deliver in-stock items, whereas commercial firms delivered in-stock items in 1 to 3 days. Military procurement of a repair part averaged 88 days versus 1/2 to 4 days for commercial firms, and the average military repair cycle was 40 to 144 days versus 3 to 14 days for commercial firms.

During Desert Storm, the just-in-case logistics system was so severely hindered by misprioritized shipments that high-priority items, such as food, ammunition, and fuel, were not delivered to participating units in a timely manner. To avert the possibility that units might run out of critical supplies, a "work-around" just-in-time distribution system called Desert Express was developed. The Army used a similar system in Bosnia to deliver critically needed supplies, particularly during the buildup phase of that operation. However, if ordered parts were not rated as high priority in the ordering process and the requisitions traveled through normal supply channels, the customer wait time was so long that it sometimes posed a threat to operational readiness.