Thinking joint—integrating Army Logistics

Army Logistician, July-August, 2004 by Lisa A. Zanglin

When Admiral Edmund P. Giambastiani, Jr., addressed the House Armed Services Committee last October on lessons learned thus far from Operation Iraqi Freedom, he described the new approach to warfare demonstrated in Iraq as "overmatching power." Giambastiani, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Commander of the U.S. Joint Forces Command, stated that the emphasis is no longer on numbers only but also on harnessing all of the capabilities the services and Special Operations Forces bring to the battlespace in a coherently joint way. This important point should be the key for developing future Army logistics systems and doctrine. Although threats from terrorists, insurgents, and enemy state-sponsored cells have dramatically changed the world in which the military operates, the responsibility of the services to defeat the enemy has not changed.

The first step toward exploiting all available capabilities is to educate the Army logistics community about existing systems and procedures that increase situational knowledge of the battlespace. Logisticians must understand combat missions in order to support them. If 9-11 has taught us anything, it is that there are no front lines and battlefields will never be linear again. The natural second step is to incorporate joint training and doctrine in all logistics planning. With insights gained from Operation Iraqi Freedom, logistics planners have discerned four important attributes that will ensure success on the battlefield. They are knowledge, speed, precision, and lethality.

Knowledge

Improved satellite capabilities made possible by new communications links have greatly improved knowledge and increased intelligence on the battlefield. The information these links provide enables extremely accurate targeting, which increases lethality and reduces the number of sorties required. Fewer sorties mean reduced fuel consumption, and fewer flying hours mean less aircraft maintenance. Fewer operational forces require a smaller logistics footprint to support them. Current Army logistics doctrine does not address the integration and leveraging of satellite capabilities or their advantages to the logistics community.

In addition to global positioning systems and satellite communications, other available technologies could greatly enhance the knowledge of logistics units. An example is multispectral imagery. Multispectral scanner systems are passive, electro-optical sensors that collect and digitally record reflected and emitted electromagnetic energy. Data obtained from these systems range from the viability of supply routes to the most abundant water sources.

Space-based systems can provide much more than weather and communications data. However, many logisticians are not familiar with these systems and the information they provide because joint training that uses these resources is seldom offered. Information on these systems can be requested through various channels, such as the S-2 (intelligence staff officer). However, most battalion S-2s are unfamiliar with the types of information satellites can produce, and space operations personnel are not authorized in the division support command. Many space systems are classified and clearance is required to request data from them.

Speed

In Operation Iraqi Freedom, forces closed on the joint area of operations in less than 90 days as opposed to the 7 months required in Operation Desert Storm. Although a smaller force equates to a smaller logistics footprint, the overall customer wait time was reduced dramatically. Modes of delivery and capabilities have improved greatly since 1990. Available bandwidth has increased more than 40 times, which has permitted direct visibility over supplies and enabled the destination of supplies to be adjusted while they are en route. This has provided more flexibility for the forces in theater because they do not have to wait for critical parts.

Some systems problems remain, however. The Army supply system is not integrated with the other services' systems. The Marine Corps has many of the same vehicles as the Army, so they can use the same repair parts. However, an Army unit could have a part shortage while a Marine Corps unit operating 1 mile downrange could have an excess of the same part. Because neither service has visibility over the other's supply system, the Army requirement would not be filled. Depending on each service's stockage level, a part also could cost one service more than it costs another.

Other coalition forces in theater often have supplies needed by U.S. forces. In many instances, supplies could be shifted to where they are needed most under the provisions of acquisition and cross-servicing agreements. These agreements with other nations' defense ministries authorize the acquisition and transfer of logistics support between the signatories. They are widely used throughout the U.S. European Command. Army logisticians also could use other types of joint and coalition support agreements to obtain needed supplies and equipment, and an automated system linking the services and coalition forces would increase the speed of delivery even more.