Logistics system strains but succeeds in operation Iraqi freedom - Alog News

Army Logistician, Sept-Oct, 2003

According to logisticians in the theater, improvements in logistics since the Gulf War of 1990 to 1991 were key to the rapid offensive movements that characterized Operation Iraqi Freedom. As Brigadier General Jack C. Stultz, deputy commander of the 377th Transportation Support Command, noted, with the combat troops of Iraqi Freedom moving at a faster pace than ever before, the ability of logisticians to keep them supplied was taxed but never was in danger of breaking down.

Stultz observed that the biggest problem was keeping up with the warfighters. "It was not so much being able to supply them, but to locate where they were moving to" Stultz said. "That tended to be a challenge for us as we moved out convoys across the desert."

Lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm helped logisticians improve the support they provided in Iraqi Freedom. Unlike Desert Storm, where logisticians built up 60 days' worth of supplies, logisticians in Iraqi Freedom had only 5 to 7 days' worth of supplies on hand. "We didn't build mountains, we moved it and smoothed it out much like you do in civilian business," Stultz said.

The technology available today helped make this possible. Computerized ordering and in-transit visibility allowed logisticians to get the job done. They could track supply orders and adjust deliveries as needed to ensure they arrived where they were needed. Fast-sealift ships (FSS) made deliveries from the continental United States, and large roll-on-roll-off ships were quickly unloaded by stevedores, thus improving the speed of the supply process. C-17 transports brought equipment into the theater, and C-130s delivered parts, food, and medical supplies to warfighters.

"From the sealift side, the FSS and LMSRs [large, medium-speed, roll-on-roll-off ships] proved invaluable," Stultz said. "The FSS because we could turn those between here and the United States on a very quick timetable and the LMSRs because of their speed of discharge, where we could discharge approximately 1,800 to 2,000 pieces of equipment in 24 to 36 hours."

The need for rapid turnaround and discharge was magnified because of the scarcity of suitable ports in Kuwait. Coalition forces had access to only one major port, the commercial port of Ash Shu'aybah, and Kuwait Navy Base, which is not designed to handle extensive dockside operations. Equipment, ammunition, and troops were discharged in stream during ship-to-shore operations at Kuwait Navy Base.

Logisticians have now turned their emphasis to sustaining the forces. They have established logistics centers in Tallil, Baghdad, and Tikrit to maintain the more than five divisions in Iraq.