Technology and acquisition program inspection - Signature Article

TIG Brief: The Inspector General, July-August, 2003 by Bradford E. Ward

Throughout the Air Force, we pride ourselves on our engineering and operational ingenuity in getting the most combat power feasible out of our weapon systems. To this extent, Dr. James G. Roche, Secretary of the Air Force, and Gen. John Jumper, Air Force Chief of Staff, have highlighted successes in recent combat operations ranging from the use of unmanned aerial vehicles with Hellfire missiles to protect Army Rangers under fire to warfighters guiding pilots to target from the back of a horse with a laptop and a global positioning system (GPS) receiver.

Clearly, maintaining our air and space superiority requires us to maintain our technological edge. Shortfalls in protecting our systems could result in others being able to duplicate, degrade or deny our access to key capabilities.

On Feb. 17, 2000, then-Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre responded to Department of Defense-wide findings in this area by directing the DoD Inspector General to ensure a uniform series of inspection on the security, technology protection, and counterintelligence practices at DoD research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) sites.

Within the Air Force, this initiative affects Air Force Space Command and certain other major commands, and charges these MAJCOMs with using a common set of DoD inspection guidelines to inspect and report on unit compliance with applicable DoD directives. Fiscal 2003 is the first year this initiative is being implemented within the Air Force. The governing memorandum of understanding between DoD and each of the service inspectors general requires DoD to annually report significant findings and recommendations resulting from these inspections to Congress in January of the following year. The Air Force Space Command Inspector General conducted a series of these inspections, dubbed "Technology Protection Inspections" (TPIs) throughout the command in fiscal 2003.

DoD IG INSPECTION GUIDELINES

One of the hardest jobs for inspectors with this initiative was using DoD IG's 14-page inspection guidelines. We've used DoD's checklist as a guide and have been working with the Air Force Inspector General staff to develop a validated checklist that is more applicable to field units and provides some priority regarding the critical items that need to be addressed.

APPLICABILITY TO RDT&E SITES

Within Air Force Space Command, the list of applicable RDT&E sites was reduced to test squadrons, operational wings at test ranges, battlelabs, acquisition staff and system program offices, and Space and Missile System Center detachments. While the acquisition staff and system program offices understood how this initiative applied to them, other units we've inspected were not certain what responsibilities they had outside of ensuring traditional security (personnel, information, physical, etc.) for the space and missile system activities they supported.

Acquisition system program offices and the Air Force Space Battlelab had the responsibility to identify critical program information (CPI) or critical system resources (CSR) associated with the capabilities they develop. The Air Force Space Battlelab, while not a System Program Office and typically dealing with commercial off the shelf (COTS) capabilities, sometimes applied these COTS capabilities with existing weapon systems to create a new unique capability. Accordingly it also had the responsibility for assessing the characteristics of these applications to determine whether there was any associated CPI or CSR and to pass on this information to the user or system program office integrating these functions.

Test squadrons, operational wings at test ranges, and acquisition detachments monitoring contractor activities all had the responsibility to be aware of the CPI and CSR for the system activities they supported and to protect them appropriately per each system's Program Protection Plan. The Air Force Space Command IG initially noted several discrepancies in program managers not assessing their CPI and CSR or feeding this information to affected field units. Fortunately, further inspections showed that program managers were aggressively taking actions to correct these discrepancies.

HIGHER HEADQUARTERS FINDINGS

In addition to the internal command issues, our IG team also identified some key higher headquarters issues relative to counterintelligence support and training, as well as Air Force-level issues regarding periodic refresher training and Air Force battlelab responsibilities for technology protection. Generally, the Air Force Inspection Agency also noted these issues in their December 2002 Eagle Look (management review), Critical Technology and Information Protection (CTIP).

The AFSPC IG has raised these issues to Secretary of the Air Force Inspector General and the agencies responsible. For further information on Air Force Space Command TPIs, as well as Air Force-level issues regarding periodic refresher training and Air Force battlelab responsibilities for technology protection, please contact AFSPC/IG.