Base contracting & force protection: building installation security into construction and service contracts

TIG Brief: The Inspector General, Sept-Oct, 2003 by Keith M. Preising

Should base contracting build antiterrorism and force protection (AT/FP) into construction and service contracts?

Today, the answer's obvious at the Air Force Academy. A year ago, it wasn't. Then the academy's AT/ FP vulnerabilities came to light.

The academy was going through a Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA). All installations must undergo a higher headquarters vulnerability assessment at least every three years. The assessment may be performed by the JSIVA team, an Air Force-level assessment team or a major command team. In addition, each installation must be assessed annually by a local team.

The road to building AT/FP into contracts started with an observation from the academy's JSIVA in August 2002. Base contracting there was not considering AT/FP in construction or service contracts.

Then the need for each base to improve security and force protection via contracting became even more clear. On June 6, 2003, 13 civilian contractor employees were arrested and charged with fraudulent use of Social Security numbers at Fort Dix and McGuire AFB, N.J.

The suspects were illegal aliens working for five different contractors performing construction and custodial jobs. Their badges gave them access to secure areas and virtually limitless access to the installations.

The academy JSIVA and the arrests in New Jersey have forced installations to think differently about many activities to ensure greater force protection. For example, before allowing access to the installation, verify workers' Social Security numbers, registered alien status and other identifying data.

When all parts of the force protection process work together, including contracting AT/FP, the result is a more secure installation.

Force protection is "a collection of activities that prevents or mitigates successful hostile actions against Air Force people and resources when they are not directly engaged with the enemy," according to Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-4.1, Force Protection, Oct. 29, 1999.

Master Sgt. Jeffrey P. Thoma quickly realized the impact of the observation and the vulnerability it presented for the academy. The superintendent, Reports and Administration, 10th Security Forces Squadron, worked with the contracting squadron and the 10th SFS to close the gap.

He began meeting with the contracting squadron to get the AT/FP consideration inserted into new contracts. The contracting office now includes criminal background checks in all statements of work for all new contracts. His efforts were highlighted in the annual Air Force Directorate of Homeland Security Major Command Conference.

Through discussions with 1st Lt. Damion Barbour, academy antiterrorism officer, a plan was devised to do background checks on every contracted employee on base in a five-station, four-step process set up at Pass and Registration. The process captures the information required for the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) and the Social Security Administration. At the request of the local DA's office, the process also includes a bilingual Criminal History Affidavit to assist with prosecution in the event of forgery, fraud, false documentation, etc.

Barbour worked with the Force Protection Working Group (FPWG), the Air Force Office of Special Investigations, contracting, the judge advocate and district attorney, and Immigration Customs Enforcement. They have processed and badged virtually all of the contractor employees on base.

The initiatives of actively engaging the base contracting office and developing the contractor badging process launched by Thoma and Barbour are excellent examples of what can happen when all the players in the process practice force protection.

Given the number of contractors accessing homeland installations every day, commanders at all levels should engage their FPWGs or Threat Working Groups (TWGs) to examine procedures in their new and existing contracts to prevent or deny access by personnel who do not meet security requirements.

What more can be done?

For information on the process instituted at the academy, contact Barbour at damion.barbour@usafa.af.mil or DSN 333-6709.

For other ideas, consult the Air Force Audit Agency's Security Controls Over Contractor Access to Air Force Installations, Report of Audit F2003-002-FD3000, Feb. 28, 2003. The conclusions, observations and recommendations in that report were forwarded to the MAJCOMs by AF/XO and may serve as a good baseline for an installation's FPWG.

Installations may also contact their MAJCOM about requesting the services of a Red Team, or invite the contracting officer to their next FPWG.

The local contracting officer and judge advocate may want to host a seminar for contractors to educate them about the vulnerability and work together with the contracting community to solve problems on the front end.

If an installation's FPWG thinks their base has a problem worthy of a task force (such as the New Jersey arrests), consult an installation AFOSI representative, who can work with the local FBI and Immigration and Naturalization Service.