Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942

Military Review, Jan-Feb, 2009 by Scott Stephenson

DEATH OF THE WEHRMACHT: The German Campaigns of 1942, Robert M. Citino, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2007, 431 pages, $34.95.

In Death of the Wehrmacht, Robert Citino returns to a thesis he introduced two years ago in his book, The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years 'War to the Third Reich. The earlier book argued that, from the 17th century to the blitzkrieg campaigns of World War 11, German military leaders have conducted their battles and campaigns in a manner that showed a striking continuity across the centuries. From the Great Elector to Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, the German "way of war" featured recklessly aggressive commanders leading rapid and decisive maneuvers against more numerous but less agile enemies. Thus, Frederick's oblique order against the right wing of an Austrian force, double the size of his own at the Battle of Leuthen in 1757, was revisited by Rommel in his panzer sweep around the British flank at Gazala in the western desert two centuries later. Similarly, Moltke's encirclement of the French army at Sedan was reprised 70 years later in the massive Kesselschlacht around Kiev during Operation Barbarossa.

In his new book, Citino condenses his centuries-wide perspective down to seven months--May to November 1942. During that period, he argues, the German-style of warfare reached its culmination and demise. The spring and early summer of 1942 saw German mechanized formations winning spectacular victories in the Crimea, the Ukraine, and the western desert of North Africa. However, by the fall, the unique German approach to campaigning ran up against insuperable obstacles--overtaxed and overextended logistics, massive Allied superiority in materiel, and finally, micromanagement by Hitler when the long string of victories could not be sustained. Empty gas tanks and "stand fast" orders from Hitler stripped German field commanders of both their independence and their ability to maneuver. Under such circumstances, debacles like Stalingrad and El Alamein were inevitable.

Given his thesis, the title of the book is somewhat misleading. We know that, despite the defeats of 1942, the Wehrmacht defended the Third Reich for two more bloody years. Citino's point is that, in their tenacious defensive battles against the overwhelming resources of the Allies, the German military was no longer conducting the unique style of command and maneuver that had led to so many battlefield triumphs since the founding of the Prussian state.

Citino writes well and makes a persuasive case. Those new to the campaigns of 1942 will find an education in this book. Those familiar with Irwin Rommel's exploits in Libya and Egypt or Fedor von Bock's drive to the Volga will find a challenging new interpretation of these famous operations.

LTC Scott Stephenson, USA, Retired, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas