Army value added along the way ahead

Military Review, May-June, 2004 by E.P. Smith

Throughout military history, particularly American military history, a commitment to build and exploit technological advantages has remained constant. As in the past, today's military strategists remain fascinated with technology and the advantages it offers and continue to debate the precedence of technology over doctrine as the driver of military force evolution.

The prevailing Transformation azimuth of senior U.S. defense strategists appears to be an extension of leveraging technology to be more precise in targeting, more lethal in effects, and less physically present in potential conflict areas. Standoff engagement is in, closing with the enemy is out; quick strike is in, deliberate action is out; shielding defensive capabilities is in, forward presence of large U.S. military forces, particularly ground forces, is out. The supported force of choice manages air and space platforms piloted from afar. Forces on the ground and at sea increasingly support one another. Key ground forces in conflict areas are "eyes-on" special operating and laser-designating detachments. Land-component forces chosen for lethal strikes are often highly tailorable Marine expeditionary units.

U.S. military services are striving to be more expeditionary, to shed expensive "footprints" forward, strike from sanctuaries on an unlevel playing field, and project and retract more power more quickly and decisively. Opinions about the mix of service contributions before, during, and after potential conflicts are shifting. Roles and missions are changing among the services--some openly, others subtly. Competition among military services for Way-Ahead resources is increasing. Yet, successful efforts at real integration of service capabilities remain incomplete.

The Army appears to be the most affected by current Transformation efforts because it is most often cited as needing reshaping and downsizing. Decoded, this means using "liberated" funding to increase other service capabilities. The questions are, What kind of Army does this country need? What unique and indispensable capability does the Army add to joint-interagency formations? Is this capability the centerpiece of the U.S. Army's Transformation effort?

My purpose is not to debate the Way Ahead. What the Army envisions as a flexible air-ground team empowered by state-of-the-art technology and traditionally proven training regimens is basically on target. Rather, I see two issues that are critical to the future U.S. military component of national power:

* How the U.S. military exploits information to sustain or regain peace in the future.

* How, when, and where the U.S. military resorts to lethal means to resolve conflicts.

These issues affect current military service reshaping, especially the Way Ahead. Both issues are fundamental to shaping the military, and there is much discussion about both. There is not much resolution about either, however, that would provide service-capability architects the specifications they need to build a sustainable, fully integrated joint force. The key to addressing these issues most responsibly and progressively is to accurately define the need for the capabilities the Army is to provide in the future.

To leverage technological advantages, the military must know the desired outcomes it wants in relation to U.S. military participation in resolving conflicts around the world. The military should also know if one template for applying military power will fit the needs of all conflicts. The real challenge is to define and apply a new American way of war and build a military superior to all others, which would reduce risks. The U.S. military force should be so powerful and effective that potential adversaries would not want to face it. So, what mix of service capabilities is needed in this type evolution of U.S. military might? What is the Army's piece of the action to complete the puzzle?

Informational Component the Key

Defense industry capitalists recognize the dominant military means of the future as information technology (IT). The true reason for a conflict will be evident. Lethal exchanges will become a last resort, and a popular consensus to do so will be easier to marshal. Only those who cannot access situational understanding via IT means or those who maintain cultural blinders will remain ignorant. However, although conflict resolution might be settled using persuasive informational capabilities more often than lethal means, lethal means might still be necessary in some situations.

Information-to-intelligence gathering and processing technology will further empower elements of national power. All military services connected through IT resources will have more precise and surgical capabilities. The truth will come out because there will be fewer places to hide the true situation.

Sustaining or Regaining Peace

Deciding to use lethal means--and how, when, and where to do so--will not get easier. However, the need to use lethal means will be more understandable for those affected. The means will depend on the mission, enemy, force fit and availability, and time available. Yet determining which lethal means to use depends on the desired outcome. Short-term outcomes might require assets from the air or sea, using information first, then using lethal means, if necessary. Most often the outcome intended will require ground assets, with outcomes and follow-on conditions culminating in the minds of adversaries. Before, during, and after such a conflict --one where long-term results are sought--soldiers will remain the military force of choice. They will remain the ultimate deterrent.