Training for war while keeping the peace

Military Review, May-June, 2004 by William G. Phelps, Jr.

As the U.S. Army enters the 21st century, its primary mission remains unchanged--to fight and win the Nation's wars. Under the rubric of peace operations (POs), the Army has participated in operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

Based on open-ended operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, the Army can expect the duration of such operations to be longer rather than shorter. The 1999 National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS) and the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) support this assertion. (1)

The Army faces a dilemma in preparing to fight and win the Nation's wars while also conducting peace operations around the world. Some might argue that the skill sets needed to fight and win wars and those associated with conducting peace operations are not mutually exclusive. (2)

The significant number of tasks mentioned are substantial enough for peace operations to be considered unique and should be treated as such. The degradation of warfighting skills resulting from executing open-ended peace operations places the Army's ability to fight and win the Nation's wars at risk.

The Army is at a crossroads in determining its 21st-century roles and missions and must strike an appropriate balance between the mandate to fight and the ramifications of conducting ever-increasing peace operations around the world. Failure to do so places the security of the United States at risk.

Key Operating Principles

An examination of the principles of military operations other than war (MOOTW) provides a starting point for identifying several unique PO characteristics. Joint Publication (JP) 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, identifies six MOOTW principles: objective, unity of effort, restraint, security, perseverance, and legitimacy. (3) Among these, objective, restraint, and perseverance provide excellent examples of unique PO characteristics.

Objective. Every military operation is directed toward a clearly defined, decisive, attainable objective. Two points of immediate conflict for commanders executing peace operations are political objectives and the influence they have on military operations and tactics.

In war, there are usually one or two clearly defined goals (objectives). However, a clearly defined objective containing the purpose, scope, end state, and mandate (if operating as part or a United Nations (UN) force) conducting a peace operation might not always be clear. Objectives change, and mandates are often adjusted to meet new needs. Poorly defined objectives often present commanders and units with significant operational challenges, the most dangerous being insufficient assets, such as equipment and personnel, to properly achieve objectives.

U.S. involvement in Somalia proceeded through three stages, and each stage was inherently different because of additional objectives. The stages included Operation Provide Relief, a humanitarian assistance (HA) mission; Operation Restore Hope, an operation that combined HA with limited military action; and UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) II, a peace-enforcement mission involving active combat and nationbuilding. (4)

What began as an HA operation under the Charter of the United Nations, chapter VI, "Pacific Settlement of Disputes," evolved into urban combat executed under chapter VII, "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace." (5) This migration from relatively benign HA missions to complex urban combat illustrates a phenomenon called mission creep.

While mission creep occurs during conventional military operations, the ramifications tend to be more significant during peace operations. The mission U.S. forces conducted in Mogadishu, Somalia, on 3 October 1993, illustrates this.

On 5 June 1993, supporters of clan warlord Mohammed Aideed killed 24 Pakistani soldiers during an ambush. Soon afterward, the UN Security Council (UNSC) passed a resolution calling for the immediate apprehension of those responsible for killing the Pakistani soldiers. (6) This quickly led to U.S. forces being used in a highly personalized manhunt for Aideed. Overnight, soldiers were forced to adjust their mental mindset from a routine of providing humanitarian support and security to a search-and-destroy mindset. The military objective, driven by political considerations, changed, resulting in 18 Americans killed and 75 wounded. In response, President Bill Clinton ordered the phased withdrawal of U.S. troops from Somalia.

The price for maintaining a safe, secure environment in Somalia exceeded the political and human capital the United States was willing to expend. Underscoring the Somalia peace operation was clearly irresponsible. We could make a compelling argument that the metamorphosis of the operation's objective led to mission failure. The objective quickly shifted from relatively benign HA operations to volatile peace-enforcement. The force in place was not sufficient or appropriate for executing later missions, and the objectives as they evolved were not attainable.