Reach: leveraging time and distance

Military Review, March-April, 2003 by John M. Custer

Give me a lever long enough and a place to sit my fulcrum and I can move the world.--Archimedes

REACH, reachback, split-based operations, sanctuary, knowledge center; this seemingly endless lexicon adds nothing to the Army's knowledge nor lends any credibility to the widely accepted but still nascent concept of reach. Seldom has an idea been so wholeheartedly embraced, so roundly advocated, yet so little understood or unimplemented. Yet, everyone firmly agrees that all future Army operations will incorporate multilevel, multifunction reach operations. I do not seek to disprove the utility of the reach concept; the intelligence community has organized itself around the concept for more than a decade and has proven its feasibility. However, to believe the doctrine is universal in its applicability without regard for some basic roles is folly.

The allure of reach is almost hypnotic. What other concept promises to be both an economy of force measure and a force multiplier? For the foreseeable future, the United States will remain a power-projection nation. We will continue to base the bulk of our forces within our continental boundaries and deploy them to whatever trouble spots or battlefields arise around the world. A number of factors govern our ability to deploy forces rapidly. Those factors include strategic lift, theater infrastructure, and communications and connectivity.

Having troops, especially support and staff function personnel contribute to the fight from outside the theater is an idea with immediate appeal. Also, if this is possible, it keeps major portions of the vast logistics tail in sanctuary or out of harm's way. Anything that contributes to fewer casualties is doubly appealing. However, since 9/11, the vulnerability of domestic installations has reinforced the fact that sanctuary is a relative term, while the increasing threat of sophisticated computer network attacks casts a different light on a concept that relies on and derives its value from the virtual environment. Still, information technology that enables forces outside the theater to affect a tactical situation is appealing.

The next century will prove the veracity of the many pronouncements that reachback already seems trite. Information and technology are ubiquitous. Time and distance are irrelevant. Here and there simply do not exist in a virtual environment. Automation empowers individuals and small groups to the detriment of organizations. Telephony and visualization will dominate future operations. Virtual reality is reality. These simple statements are irrefutable and are the foundation of the reach concept. The bottom line is that revolutionary information technologies and the growing understanding of knowledge-centric operations, coupled with the desire to tailor combat formations to a situation, have given birth to a concept by which commanders can tailor operational forces while actually enhancing the decisionable information they receive and disseminate. All of this seems to be the perfect solution, of course, and at first glance appears easily accomplished. Yet, the truth is that reach is rocket science. The seamless orchestration of worldwide connectivity at multiple levels of security with a variety of protocols and permissions to access and interact with hundreds of databases that autonomous national agencies, the Department of Defense, joint commands, and coalition partners maintain while also maintaining complete and accurate awareness of tactical and operational situations thousands of miles distant and providing information in an anticipatory mode is a daunting task.

The operational and organizational concept (O&O) for the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) captures the initial vision for the Army's Transformation of future tactical forces. (1) Although the document was not written as a final vision of the Army's Objective Force, it represents a bridge to the future and offers a brief survey that reveals that much is left to the imagination. In 14 instances, the document attributes specific functions, operations, and end states to reachback concepts. For example, it says that "the IBCT is dependent upon the division and higher echelons of command for reachback linkages to expand its capabilities in the areas of information, intelligence, joint effects, force protection, and sustainment." (2)

The O&O concept describes reachback as an O&O principle. Great efficiencies in manpower and equipment have been achieved in force design by proclaiming that functions that can be accomplished out of theater or through reachback to higher levels of command will not be incorporated into the IBCT organic force structure. The O&O document explains that the IBCT will execute reachback on a "routine, deliberate basis as a combat-multiplier with the concept enabling the IBCT to reduce its footprint in the area of operations without compromising its ability to accomplish the assigned missions." (3) The IBCT O&O concept lays out the following three crucial components to assure an effective reachback capability: