All the Factors of Victory: Admiral Joseph Mason Reeves and the Origins of Carrier Airpower

Military Review, March-April, 2004 by Gregory Fontenot

ALL THE FACTORS OF VICTORY: Admiral Joseph Mason Reeves and the Origins of Carrier Airpower, Thomas Wildenberg, Brassey's Inc., Washington, DC, 2003, 326 pages, $27.50.

Before dawn on 26 January 1929, during an exercise called Fleet Problem Nine, the USS Saratoga launched a 70-plane strike force toward the Panama Canal. Shortly after the strike began, the Saratoga encountered four "enemy" battleships. Rather than come about and outrun the slower battleships, the Saratoga ignored the battleships and continued toward the planned rendezvous site for the returning strike force.

Rear Admiral Joseph Mason Reeves, who commanded the carrier group, had no alternative. That era's poor communications and a paucity of tools for airborne navigation prevented the Saratoga from fleeing the enemy battleships if she were to recover her aircraft.

Unaware of the Saratoga's dilemma, the strike force "attacked and destroyed" key locks on the Canal and returned safely to the carrier. Despite the limitations of the era's technology, the exercise ended as an equivocal success.

In All the Factors of Victory, author Thomas Wildenberg illuminates the career and character of Reeves during the years from the Spanish-American War to the end of World War II. Reeves invented the concept of the carrier battle group, which continues to afford the United States virtual sovereignty over the seas and assures responsive carrier-based airpower anywhere. Reeves was an unlikely radical. Fastidious in his appearance, almost hidebound in his devotion to the Navy, and conservative in most things he did, Reeves saw the potential of aviation and fought hard to assure the carrier's future in an era when battleship admirals held sway.

Reeves' story is compelling. He graduated from the Naval Academy in 1894 and joined the fleet as it was transitioning from sail and steam ironclad ships to the big-gun battle-wagons. Commissioned as an engineer when the Navy sharply divided engineers from deck officers, Reeves served aboard the USS Oregon as it led the chase to destroy the Spanish squadron sortieing from Santiago de Cuba. Reeves proved particularly talented at getting the most out of coal-fired power plants in turn-of-the-century warships.

Reeves was a brilliant engineer, and he became a brilliant line officer. Later, after transitioning to the line, he became an expert in the arcane problems of naval gunnery. In 1925, perceiving the potential of aviation, Reeves trained as a naval aviation observer and became the first aviation officer promoted to flag rank. Ultimately Reeves, who was a thoughtful, superb analyst and a proponent of aviation, commanded the fleet and supported the development of carrier aviation.

In publishing the first biography of this remarkable officer, Wildenberg does the Navy and military history a valuable service. Reeves left few papers behind, so Wildenberg uses a variety of sources, ranging from newspapers, official documents and accounts of Reeves in secondary sources, to piece together a compelling, lucid account.

Wildenberg's contribution to understanding the Navy and the matter of transformation generally is valuable. Change that appears revolutionary in retrospect seems evolutionary. Reeves' conceptual thinking not only outpaced the technology of the day, but to some extent it also drove technical innovation. His story reveals as much about the means of change as it does the effects.

Reeves' view of the world and his obligations as an officer are best illustrated by an observation he made to his chief of staff the night before the "strike" on the Panama Canal. His chief opined that there were plenty of "brass hats" who wanted to see Reeves and the air strike fail. Reeves replied, "I know, but a commander who stops to appraise the effect of a military decision upon his personal fortunes has no right to be entrusted with a command."

COL Gregory Fontenot, USA,

Retired, Lansing, Kansas