Eagles & Bulldogs In Normandy 1944: The American 29th Division from Omaha to St Lo, the British 3rd Infantry Division from Sword Beach to Caen

Military Review, March-April, 2005 by Robert J. Rielly

EAGLES & BULLDOGS IN NORMANDY 1944: The American 29th Division from Omaha to St Lo, the British 3rd Infantry Division from Sword Beach to Caen, Michael Reynolds, Casemate, Havertown, PA, 2003, 230 pages, $32.95.

With the publication of Eagles and Bulldogs, historian Michael Reynolds has once again authored a well-written, thoroughly researched history of World War II. Unlike his previous three books, which dealt with the history of the I and II SS Panzer Corps during the final years of World War II, and another work, which dealt with Jochen Peiper, this book focuses on Allied forces and describes the exploits of the American 29th Infantry Division (from Omaha Beach to St. Lo) and the British 3d Division (from Sword Beach to Caen). Caen and St. Lo were road hubs captured to secure and expand the beachhead for the drive to Germany.

Reynolds allows the reader to compare and contrast how each division was trained and led, the tactics they used, their leaders' command styles, and how they achieved their missions. He states up front this was not an easy book to write. He "was often dismayed and depressed by what he discovered [because] the closer one [got] to the men, the more conscious one [became] of the human cost and the inadequacies of some leaders." After reading the book, many will agree with Reynolds' assessment.

The book has several unique, appealing qualities. Reynolds includes the German Army and French civilian perspectives in the narrative, allowing the reader to compare Allied plans to the German version of events and to understand how decisions affected the populations of Caen and St. Lo. In addition, the maps accompanying the text allow the reader to visualize the narrative. The one drawback is they are in black and white, which makes it difficult to determine elevation differences.

Reynolds provides balanced views about German opposition and the controversial decisions each division made. He does not shy from placing blame where his analysis leads him, and he does not hesitate to reinterpret facts and events presented in previous histories. In fact, some of his severest criticism is about the British Army's failure to train its senior officers in combined arms warfare.

Reynolds's analysis of division and brigade leaders is enlightening, especially when he examines leadership errors that resulted in the initial attack toward Caen by one depleted infantry battalion and some tanks. Descriptions of the lack of urgency, misreading the higher commander's intent, and delays and missed opportunities are sure to give the reader cause to question some commanders' decisions and provide areas for reflection, especially concerning the relief of commanders.

Readers are sure to enjoy this splendid, well-researched book about two divisions, and will want to have it as a part of their libraries. Even with the numerous histories of the Normandy Campaign available today, this book stands out.

LTC Robert J. Rielly, UA, Retired, For Leavenworth, Kansas