Nicaragua: civilians and military after the Sandinista revolution

Military Review, March-April, 2005 by Margarita Castillo Villarreal

IN SOCIETIES undergoing democratic transition, as in those with stable democracies, civil authorities and the army are social actors involved in conflict and in its resolution within the structure of the state. Civil-military interaction is governed by the authority that comes from the framework of legal precepts that weigh on military institutions--precepts that subordinate them to legitimately constituted civil authorities.

The encounter between civilians and the military is also an equation of power. Conflict is inherent to civil-military interaction and levies a requirement for negotiation. In private, civilians and the military use negotiation and diverse methods of persuasion to develop laws and policies regarding national defense.

Nicaragua represents one case in which the interaction between civil authorities and the military occurred after negotiations and a peaceful transfer of power ensured the stability of military institutions and established a basis for civil-military relations in harmony with democracy.

In 1990, after some 11 years in power, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) lost the presidential election in Nicaragua to the National Union of Opposition (UNO). Violeta Barrios de Chamorro became president on 25 February 1990, replacing FSLN leader Daniel Ortega, who had been the country's president since 1984. The results of the voting created a highly volatile situation: a liberal government assumed power, and a leftist army, born of revolution, subordinated itself to the new civilian authority.

When the FSLN triumphed in the revolution of 1979, it abolished the National Guard, which had protected dictator Anastasio Somoza's family, and replaced it with a new military structure--the Sandinista Peoples Army (EPS). The EPS was the armed wing of the FSLN, the party that led the Sandinista Popular Revolution. From 1979 until 1990, it was impossible to separate the state, the army, and the party; the EPS was part of the political and ideological apparatus that supported the revolution.

Nicaragua succeeded in overcoming the crisis created by the electoral results, thanks to the signing of a Protocol of Transition between the Sandinistas and representatives of UNO. The Protocol of Transition (Transition Accords) was a formal document through which the newly elected government pledged to respect the army's institutional integrity and its command structure in accordance with the Constitution and laws of Nicaragua. The accords also supported the army's professionalization. In exchange for these concessions, the EPS set aside its role as a partisan army and transformed itself into a professional organization that accepted the authority of the newly elected government. The act of transforming itself became the principal guarantee of its stability.

As one by-product of the Transition Accords, Chamorro retained the services of General Humberto Ortega, Daniel Ortega's brother and the commander of the EPS, during the approximately 11 years of the Sandinista revolution. But, Chamorro's decision did not have the blessing of conservative sectors of the country or of the U.S. Government, which saw General Ortega as one of the main obstacles to army modernization and the consolidation of democracy. General Ortega's continued presence as head of the EPS became a major issue of national debate. (1) His presence cast doubt that previous partisan links between the EPS and the FSLN had ended, making it more difficult to assimilate the EPS. (2)

FSLN national directorate member Luis Carrion described the difficult situation the EPS faced: "[During the revolution] there was simply a mix of civilian and military in the power structure. The army exercised a portion of the political power beyond the strictly military sphere. [This] was very damaging for relations between the army and a large portion of Nicaraguan society because the army merged with the civilian sector of the Sandinista government, which necessarily divorced it from the rest of society that was not oriented toward the Sandinistas and had different political views. This made the process of assimilation of the army as a national institution much more difficult." (3)

General Ortega's service as chief of the EPS suggested the army was a corporate institution with ties not just to the Sandinistas but to General Ortega himself, which posed obstacles to EPS professionalization. Journalist Carlos Fernando Chamorro notes: "Ortega depoliticized the army in the real sense of the word.... I do not believe that he did it out of political altruism but out of personal interest. He took the army from a partisan mold and recast it in a definitively institutional one--subordinated to his personal leadership, of course." (4)

General Ortega's continued presence revealed that the military's modernization process was incomplete, and his retirement was a fundamental step forward in the professionalization of Nicaragua's armed forces.

The Crisis of 2 September 1993

Although President Chamorro remained committed to defending the EPS's institutional integrity, getting rid of General Ortega was always a political necessity for her government. Responding to external and internal pressure from the U.S. Government and the Nicaraguan right, President Chamorro claimed General Ortega's continued presence in the army was temporary and that he would retire from the military when she determined the opportune time for him to do so. For his part, General Ortega publicly questioned President Chamorro's power to discharge him from his post and emphasized that he alone would make the decision.